

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 25-JUN-2018 TIME: 1730 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Talos Energy Offshore LLC

REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT: 8. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: G12027

AREA: PL LATITUDE:
BLOCK: 5 LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: B
RIG NAME:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:

- HISTORIC INJURY
 - REQUIRED EVACUATION
 - LTA (1-3 days)
 - LTA (>3 days)
 - RW/JT (1-3 days)
 - RW/JT (>3 days)
 - Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- UNDERGROUND
 - SURFACE
 - DEVERTER
 - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

9. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

10. WATER DEPTH: 32 FT.
11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 4 MI.
12. WIND DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.
13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: M.P.H.
14. SEA STATE: FT.
15. PICTURES TAKEN:
16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

At approximately 1730 hours on 25-June-2018, an H2S release and muster incident occurred on the South Pelto 5-B (PL-5-B) platform, Lease OCS-G 12027. The operator of record is Talos Energy Offshore LLC.

While nearing the final phases of abandonment operations involving eight platforms and fifteen pipelines, the work crews were positioned on the PL-5-B structure and on a lift barge situated next to the platform. During flushing operations, several of the platforms and their existing pipelines were connected together to aide in the removal of all existing oil, condensate, and water in the pipelines. As per operational procedure, the oil and condensate were sent to vessels on PL-5-B and the water was sent to an open top flow back tank. One of the workers reported to the construction superintendant that he believed he detected an odor of Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) gas at the open top tank. An H2S detector was used and recorded 100 Parts per million (ppm) of the gas. All operations were stopped and personnel mustered in the quarters of the lift barge for safety. At the time of detection of the gas, hourly readings were taken. The readings steadily decreased from 100 ppm at 1730 hours to 0 ppm at 0330 hours on 26-June-2018. A clean-up crew arrived later that morning and the open top tank was neutralized with an H2S scavenger. No personnel were injured or suffered ill effects during the incident.

On 28-June-2018 a BSEE inspector traveled to South Pelto 23-D to investigate the PL-5-B incident. Statements were taken along with interviews performed.

During the course of the investigation, BSEE inspectors received information that indicated the South Pelto 5-C field, along with its surrounding pipelines, were flushed with seawater more than two years prior to these abandonment operations. A high level of bacteria was found in the water by the safety clean-up crew. It is believed the length of time the water stayed in the pipelines increased the chance of high concentrations of bacteria which eventually led to small pockets of H2S gas.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Water left in the pipelines for an extended time allowed for high concentrations of bacteria growth which led to small pockets of H2S gas.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

N/A

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

N/A

N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

The Houma District has no recommendations for the Office Of Incident Investigations.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE: None.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION: 28-JUN-2018

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

James Hamilton /

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan Domangue

APPROVED **16-OCT-2018**

DATE: