

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR -
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT -
GULF OF MEXICO REGION -

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **11-MAR-2015** TIME: **0900** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **W & T Offshore, Inc.**

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE: -

CONTRACTOR: **Helmerich & Payne -**

REPRESENTATIVE: -

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER **Accidental Sheared Pipe**

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **G13079**

AREA: **EW** LATITUDE:

BLOCK: **910** LONGITUDE: -

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: - **A**

RIG NAME: **H&P 203**

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)

DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE -
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

7. TYPE:

HISTORIC INJURY -

- REQUIRED EVACUATION
- LTA (1-3 days)
- LTA (>3 days)
- RW/JT (1-3 days)
- RW/JT (>3 days)
- Other Injury -

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

LWC - HISTORIC BLOWOUT

- UNDERGROUND
- SURFACE
- DEVERTER
- SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K

9. WATER DEPTH: **557** FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **66** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: **N**
SPEED: **1** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION: **N**
SPEED: **1** M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: **1** FT.

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS: -

On March 11, 2015 the H&P 203 accidentally sheared the 5 7/8" drill pipe while setting a test plug. Leading up to the incident the rig had set and cemented the 13 5/8" casing and installed the well head, and were preparing to test Blow Out Preventers (BOP's). According to rig personnel, as soon as the rig broke circulation with the cement unit the Blind Shear Rams (BSR's) closed on the 5 7/8" drill pipe. The test plug, a 20 foot pup joint, and 22.35' of 5 7/8" drill pipe was left in the hole.

In the investigation that followed, a contact switch in the rig floor panel for the close side of the shear ram function was found stuck in the closed position. If someone had pushed the "Push to Operate" button in this condition, the BSR's would have automatically closed. Under normal circumstances one would push the "Push to Operate" button, and simultaneously push another command button (such as annular close, annular open, BSR close, etc...) in order to carry out the desired function.

Prior to this incident there was no alarm or warning mechanism in place to notify rig personnel that the contact switch was stuck in the closed position. Following the incident the logic in control station was changed so that the indicator light will flash if the switch is stuck in either the open or closed position.

No personnel accepted responsibility for pushing the "Push to Operate" button, but it is evident that a member of the rig crew pushed the button with plans to make a different function. However, due to the contact switch for the BSR's being stuck in the closed position, as soon as the "Push to Operate" button was pressed the BSR's fired.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

- The contactor switch for the close side of the BSR's was stuck in the closed position. -

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

- There was no alarm or warning mechanism in place to notify rig personnel that the contact switch was stuck in the closed position.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

One joint of drill pipe.

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Sheared.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

\$4,500 -

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:
The Houma District has no recommendations for the BSEE Region at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

13-MAR-2015

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

James Richard /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan Domangue

APPROVED

DATE: **30-APR-2015**