

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR -
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT -
GULF OF MEXICO REGION -

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1. OCCURRED

DATE: **16-OCT-2014** TIME: **2250** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Energy Resource Technology GOM, In**
REPRESENTATIVE:
TELEPHONE: -
CONTRACTOR: -
REPRESENTATIVE: -
TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER **Rig Power Loss/Disconnect**

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: **G15563**
AREA: **GC** LATITUDE:
BLOCK: **237** LONGITUDE: -

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM:
RIG NAME: **ENSCO 8502**

6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION
(DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:
 HISTORIC INJURY -
 REQUIRED EVACUATION
 LTA (1-3 days)
 LTA (>3 days)
 RW/JT (1-3 days)
 RW/JT (>3 days)
 Other Injury -

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE -
SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER _____

FATALITY
 POLLUTION
 FIRE
 EXPLOSION

9. WATER DEPTH: **2240** FT.

LWC - HISTORIC BLOWOUT
 UNDERGROUND
 SURFACE
 DEVERTER
 SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **96** MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION: -
SPEED: **6** M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:
SPEED: **1** M.P.H.

COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K 13. SEA STATE: FT.

On October 16, 2014, a loss of power onboard the Ensco 8502 resulted in the Emergency Disconnect System (EDS) being activated from the drill floor.

At the time of the incident, the Ensco 8502 was conducting drilling operations on Energy Resource Technology's 002 well, located in Green Canyon 237, lease number OCSG-15563. The crews had just finished cementing operations on the 13 5/8 inch casing and were in the process of testing the Blow-Out Preventers (BOPs) when the incident occurred.

At approximately 22:42 hours on the day of the incident, a blown fuse on the #4 generator caused a series of events throughout the ship's electrical system which resulted in a temporary loss of four of the vessel's eight thrusters. The vessel, now only operating with half its thrusters, was unable to maintain its position due to the currents. As the crew tried to maintain control, the ship slowly began drifting closer to the "Red Zone", located approximately 82 feet from well center. The "Red Zone" is an area designated by the operator to give a warning when the ship is too far off course and in danger of damaging drilling equipment subsea. Once the "Red Zone" was reached, approximately 3 minutes after the blown fuse, the Driller onboard the rig activated the EDS from the drill floor. Upon activating the EDS, the system is designed to shear any pipe across the stack and close the Annular before unlatching the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) from the BOP. This process should enable the rig to secure the fluid in the riser via the closed Annular and seal off the wellbore via the Blind Shear Rams (BSRs). Once complete, the ship can drift away without causing any further damage to the riser or BOP Stack.

The EDS system worked as designed, and the crew regained control of the vessel approximately 519 feet away from the ships original position. As a result of the incident, approximately 150 barrels of SBM were released into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The fluid loss came from the remaining drill pipe in the riser and through the choke and kill hoses running from surface.

The incident was reported, and no injuries were sustained. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) both began an investigation into the incident. The Riser was displaced immediately with sea water to prevent any further release of SBM into offshore waters. Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) footage showed that the well was secure and undamaged, and the crew began working with the USCG to determine what was needed to ensure a safe operation before proceeding with well work.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

- Electrical problems with the ships generators caused the loss of four of the rig's eight thrusters.

-Driller activated the EDS upon the ship reaching the "Red Zone."

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

N/A

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

A joint investigation was performed by BSEE and the USCG regarding the incident. BSEE's investigation focused on the EDS and well specific side of the incident. The USCG's investigation focused on the dynamic positioning and electrical systems of the incident.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

N/A

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

Houma District has no recommendations for BSEE at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

N/A

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

17-OCT-2014

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

Cemal Ozoral / Clinton Campo /
James Richard /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Bryan Domangue

APPROVED

DATE: **07-JAN-2015**