

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT  
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 23-DEC-2016 TIME: 1550 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Ridgelake Energy, Inc.

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING DEVICE
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR  
ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

6. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: 00420

AREA: SS LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 154 LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: E-AUX

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:  EXPLORATION(POE)  
 DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION  
(DOCD/POD)

8. CAUSE:

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

7. TYPE:

- HISTORIC INJURY
  - REQUIRED EVACUATION
  - LTA (1-3 days)
  - LTA (>3 days)
  - RW/JT (1-3 days)
  - RW/JT (>3 days)
  - Other Injury

- FATALITY
- POLLUTION
- FIRE
- EXPLOSION

- LWC  HISTORIC BLOWOUT
- UNDERGROUND
  - SURFACE
  - DEVERTER
  - SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

9. WATER DEPTH: 54 FT.

10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 28 MI.

11. WIND DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

12. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. SEA STATE: FT.

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

## 17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

At approximately 1550 hours on December 23, 2016, an incident occurred on a fixed structure located at Ship Shoal Block 154 (E-Auxilliary platform), OCS 00420. The operator of record is Ridgelake Energy, Inc. (Ridgelake), who contracts Island Operating Co. onboard this facility.

During normal production operations, personnel noticed smoke coming from the exhaust stack on the Heater Treater (NBK-1800). After shutting off the fuel gas to the burner, the operator noticed a small fire inside the fire tube and left to retrieve a handheld fire extinguisher. When he returned, the fire was already out. The treater was drained of all fluids, and the fire tube was removed and sent to a fabrication and repair yard in Scott, Louisiana. BSEE inspectors were there on December 29, 2016, to witness the sandblasting and cleaning of the fire tube, as well as to assess the damage.

## 18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

It appears the major areas of corrosion/pitting were in the welds of the tube where the fluid interface mixed with corrosive chemicals, thereby damaging the metal. As a result of the investigation, Ridgelake placed various types of corrosion testing coupons within the treater, which will remain until the tube is pulled on the next inspection. Once the coupons are retrieved, they will be sent to a laboratory for metal loss testing. The treater was placed back in service on February 02, 2017.

## 19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

It is possible that chemicals may have been introduced into the heater or through the production system to aid in the breakup of chemical padding in the treater. As found in previous investigations in the Houma District, certain chemicals introduced into the production system are extremely caustic and over time will have a detrimental effect on metal in the production process.

## 20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

Once the tube is removed from a treater, visual inspection alone may not ascertain if a corrossion problem is occurring. Before the tube was cleaned, only surface buildup on the tube was evident. After the tube was cleaned, it was obvious that errossion to the welds had occurred.

## 21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

**Fire Tube**

## NATURE OF DAMAGE:

**Corrosion/pitting**

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):                   **\$175,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE NARRATIVE:

**The Houma District recommends that once the fire tube is pulled for inspection, it should be cleaned thoroughly--especially around the welded areas and any areas where fluid/chemical interface may occur--to determine whether or not corrosion or metal loss may be an issue.**

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

**N/A**

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

**29-DEC-2016**

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

**Greg Liner 478 / Sammy Viola 211 /  
Terry Hollier 114 /**

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

**Bryan Domangue**

APPROVED

DATE: **14-APR-2017**