UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED
   DATE: **02-FEB-2020** TIME: **1230** HOURS

2. OPERATOR: **Eni US Operating Co. Inc.**
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:
   CONTRACTOR:
   REPRESENTATIVE:
   TELEPHONE:

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

4. LEASE: **G12142**
   AREA: **EW** LATITUDE:
   BLOCK: **921** LONGITUDE:

5. PLATFORM: **A-Morpeth East**
   RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:
   - [ ] EXPLORATION(POE)
   - [X] DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

7. TYPE:
   INJURIES:
   - [ ] HISTORIC INJURY

	OPERATOR	CONTRACTOR
[ ] REQUIRED EVACUATION		
[ ] LTA (1-3 days)		
[ ] LTA (>3 days)		
[ ] RW/JT (1-3 days)		
[ ] RW/JT (>3 days)		
[ ] FATALITY		
[ ] Other Injury		

   - [ ] POLLUTION
   - [ ] FIRE
   - [ ] EXPLOSION

   LWC
   - [ ] HISTORIC BLOWOUT
   - [ ] UNDERGROUND
   - [ ] SURFACE
   - [ ] DEVERTER
   - [ ] SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

   COLLISION [ ] HISTORIC [X] >$25K [ ] <=$25K

- [X] STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- [X] CRANE
- [ ] OTHER LIFTING
- [ ] DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- [X] INCIDENT >$25K
- [ ] H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- [ ] REQUIRED MUSTER
- [ ] SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- [ ] OTHER

8. OPERATION:
   - [X] PRODUCTION
   - [ ] DRILLING
   - [ ] WORKOVER
   - [ ] COMPLETION
   - [ ] HELICOPTER
   - [ ] MOTOR VESSEL
   - [ ] PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
   - [X] OTHER **Decommissioning**

9. CAUSE:
   - [X] EQUIPMENT FAILURE
   - [X] HUMAN ERROR
   - [ ] EXTERNAL DAMAGE
   - [ ] SLIP/TRIP/FALL
   - [ ] WEATHER RELATED
   - [ ] LEAK
   - [ ] UPSET H2O TREATING
   - [ ] OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
   - [ ] OTHER _____

10. WATER DEPTH: **1700** FT.
11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: **71** MI.
12. WIND DIRECTION:
    SPEED: **17** M.P.H.
13. CURRENT DIRECTION:
    SPEED: M.P.H.
14. SEA STATE: **7** FT.
15. PICTURES TAKEN:
16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

On 02 February 2020, at 1230 hours, an allision occurred during decommissioning of pipeline riser segment # 11458 at ENI US Operating Co. Inc. Ewing Banks (EW) 921 A, OCS-G 12142 tension leg platform (TLP). The TLP had reached a 20-year design life and ceased all production as of 18 August 2018. The facility is currently out of service with no plans to return to service. All subsea wells were permanently abandoned as of 13 June 2019.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The crew onboard at the time consisted of ENI engineers, consultants, construction crew members, platform operators, and Motor Vessel (M/V) marine crew members. A job safety analysis (JSA) meeting was conducted before rigging up a 12-inch pipeline. The crew noted weather in favorable conditions with clear skies, 5-7-foot seas and 15 knot winds. The M/V was positioned on the southeast corner of the TLP at approximately 70-80 feet away.

The crew connected all associated rigging from the TLP to the stern of the M/V using the M/V crane. The crew began following the written procedures. Operations were proceeding fine according to the crews. Suddenly, the weight of the pipeline overwhelmed the power of the M/V crane. The main 300-ton winch located on the M/V was paying out unexpectedly. The shackle attached to the main line became wedged into the sheave on the TLP. The M/V had taken the full payload of the pipeline at this time. With the momentum the pipeline descending, the M/V was pulling toward the TLP despite the using 100% power and could not be stopped in time. After several attempts to free the shackle, the M/V was unsuccessful in freeing the wedged shackle. The M/V encountered the TLP topside resulting in significant damage to TLP top deck and the M/V crane. After the M/V was unsuccessful in removing the pipeline, ENI hired the Q4000 semisubmersible to complete the job. When the Q4000 arrived on location, the M/V cut the 300-ton deck winch wire to release the M/V from EW 921-A facility. The M/W moved out 500 meters, making room for the Q4000 semi-submersible to come in to remove the pipeline.

BSEE INVESTIGATION:

On 14 February 2020, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) New Orleans District Accident Investigator performed an onsite investigation. The Investigator obtained witness statements, photographed the incident site, requested JSAs and interviewed key witnesses that were on the facility at the time of the incident. The facility is no longer producing and decommissioning operations are currently underway. In an effort to make the damaged area safe, hard handrails have been installed to prevent any future access.

CONCLUSION:

Before the lift, the engineering and installation contractor reported to ENI that the vessel they chartered to conduct the work on ENI's behalf had sufficient capacity (bollard pull) to hold position while the pipeline was being disconnected and abandoned. It was discovered this was incorrect while trying to remove the disconnected riser.

Vessel thrusters were performing as designed according to the vessel owner. However, the vessel was not designed for the required bollard pull. The engineering and installation contractor performed extensive calculations for all stages of the lift, but they did not confirm the vessel's bollard pull against these calculations.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure - Capacity of equipment exceeded: The vessel was not designed for the required bollard pull.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

As part of the Platform abandonment activities, a large winch had been installed on the stern of the M/V. The intended operation was for the winch to be used to lift a riser free from a socket that attached the riser to the Platform. The M/V was stern to the platform and about 310' away. The winch' s cable was routed through a brace on the platform and then run subsurface and connected to the top of the riser. At 1245 hours, the Captain, in command at the aft DP control station, applied forward thrust (at the request of the onboard project supervisor) in an attempt to assist the deck winch in hoisting the riser. A hold-back cable (that was attached from the platform to the riser) severed, which resulted in additional reverse tension being applied to the vessel's deck winch cable. The sudden increase in reverse tension on the deck winch cable pulled the M/V toward the Platform.

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

• Facility damage: Damaged to top decking, handrails, bottle rack, out of service compressor cooling tower piping and facility crane (facility crane was not in use at the time of the incident) $161K
• Motor Vessel Damage: M/V crane damaged. $175K

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Motor Vessel collided with platform during decommission operations.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): **$336,000**

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE New Orleans District makes no recommendations to the Office of Incident Investigation.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: **NO**

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

14-FEB-2020

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

Pierre Lanoix

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

David Trocquet

APPROVED DATE: **28-MAY-2020**