

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT  
GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

For Public Release

1. OCCURRED

DATE: 01-AUG-2021 TIME: 1010 HOURS

2. OPERATOR: Talos Energy Offshore LLC

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

CONTRACTOR:

REPRESENTATIVE:

TELEPHONE:

- STRUCTURAL DAMAGE
- CRANE
- OTHER LIFTING
- DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
- INCIDENT >\$25K
- H2S/15MIN./20PPM
- REQUIRED MUSTER
- SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE
- OTHER

3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:

8. OPERATION:

4. LEASE: G01238

AREA: PL LATITUDE:

BLOCK: 23 LONGITUDE:

- PRODUCTION
- DRILLING
- WORKOVER
- COMPLETION
- HELICOPTER
- MOTOR VESSEL
- PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
- OTHER

5. PLATFORM: D

RIG NAME:

6. ACTIVITY:

- EXPLORATION(POE)
- DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)

9. CAUSE:

7. TYPE:

INJURIES:

HISTORIC INJURY

OPERATOR CONTRACTOR

REQUIRED EVACUATION

LTA (1-3 days)

LTA (>3 days)

RW/JT (1-3 days)

RW/JT (>3 days)

FATALITY

Other Injury

- EQUIPMENT FAILURE
- HUMAN ERROR
- EXTERNAL DAMAGE
- SLIP/TRIP/FALL
- WEATHER RELATED
- LEAK
- UPSET H2O TREATING
- OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
- OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

POLLUTION

FIRE

EXPLOSION

LWC  HISTORIC BLOWOUT

UNDERGROUND

SURFACE

DEVERTER

SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES

10. WATER DEPTH: 61 FT.

11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 20 MI.

12. WIND DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

13. CURRENT DIRECTION:  
SPEED: M.P.H.

14. SEA STATE: FT.

15. PICTURES TAKEN:

16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

COLLISION  HISTORIC  >\$25K  <=\$25K

At approximately 1000 hours on 8/01/2021, a fire occurred on Talos Energy, South Pelto Block 23 Platform D. While making normal rounds on the platform, a Production Operator noticed black smoke coming from the Heater Treater (NBK-2900) stack. He notified the PIC and went to investigate by looking through the inspection cover. The Operator noticed a small fire. The heater treater was immediately shut in. The Operator and PIC turned the gas off, opened the front cover hatch, and utilized one dry chemical extinguisher to put out the incipient fire. Upon further inspection, a pinhole leak was seen in the fire tube.

A pattern of fires has occurred on this vessel, one on February 29, 2016 and one on April 8, 2018. Since the fire in 2018, a new fire tube was fabricated and installed. A full inspection was completed in April of 2021 of the current fire tube by Oceaneering. There was no evidence of cracks, pitting, or erosion found during this inspection.

Investigations found that normal operating temperatures during the summer is 110-115 degrees Fahrenheit (F) and winter is 115-120 degrees F. However, facility engineering indicated that the maximum operating temperatures should be lower than 105 degrees F. The operating high or high-high temperature settings were not indicated on operating procedures posted on the platform. The temperature control for the media was done manually by operators increasing or decreasing gas flow to each burner. When the fire tube was removed, "residual solids" were present on the fire tube. After analysis, it was determined to be paraffin related associated with higher temperatures. Paraffin solid formation could have led to insufficient heat transfer. Findings also indicated all chemicals that were used were compatible.

Since the fire, a new burner and fire tube were fabricated and tested before installation. A stainless steel heat shroud was installed over both burners to prevent direct contact of the flame to the fire tube. Since the fire, a new throttle type burner has been installed to keep a more constant temperature across both burner tubes. Operating procedures have been updated to show the high temperature setting.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Fire tube temperature was normally running at higher temperature than it was designed.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Operating procedures did not show the high temperature settings of the fire tube.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Fire tube

Pin hole leak

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$250,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The BSEE Houma District has no recommendations to OII at this time.

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

None

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

**04-AUG-2021**

26. INVESTIGATION TEAM MEMBERS:

**Kelly Bouzigard / Bruce Crabtree /**

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

PANEL FORMED: **NO**

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

**Amy Pellegrin**

APPROVED

DATE:

**08-DEC-2021**