## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT GULF OF MEXICO REGION

## **ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**

$H_{-}$	TRUCTURAL DAMAGE
2 OPENIED Gartier IIG	RANE THER LIFTING AMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS.
TELEPHONE: H CONTRACTOR: R REPRESENTATIVE: S	NCIDENT >\$25K Glycol Reboiler Still Column 22S/15MIN./20PPM EQUIRED MUSTER HUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE THER
3. OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	8. OPERATION:  X PRODUCTION
4. LEASE: 00386  AREA: ST LATITUDE: BLOCK: 23 LONGITUDE:	DRILLING WORKOVER COMPLETION HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL
5. PLATFORM: CC RIG NAME:	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.  DECOMMISSIONING  PA PIPELINE SITE CLEARANCE  TA PLATFORM
6. ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE)  X DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION	OTHER
(DOCD/POD)  7. TYPE: INJURIES:  HISTORIC INJURY  OPERATOR CONTRACTO  REQUIRED EVACUATION  LTA (1-3 days)  LTA (>3 days)  RW/JT (1-3 days)  RW/JT (>3 days)  FATALITY	9. CAUSE:  X EQUIPMENT FAILURE X HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H2O TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER
Other Injury	10. WATER DEPTH: 50 FT.
POLLUTION X FIRE EXPLOSION	11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 7 MI.  12. WIND DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H.
LWC   HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND SURFACE DEVERTER SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	13. CURRENT DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H.  14. SEA STATE: FT.  15. PICTURES TAKEN:
COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <=\$25K	16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

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EV2010R

On January 29, 2024 at approximately 1745, a Fire occurred on Glycol Reboiler vent line. Operators were adding glycol to the system following a platform shut down. The incident occurred on Cantium LLC facility South Timbalier Block 23 CC OCS 00166.

At approximately 1730, the facility shut in due to a Level Safety Low (LSL) on the Glycol Surge Tank (ABJ 102). While operators were pumping more Glycol into the Surge Vessel a flame was noticed coming from the Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) vent line for the Glycol Reboiler (BBC 201) when the valve relieved pressure. At that time pumping operations stopped and calls were made to the field Forman and HSE. No Emergency Shut Down (ESD) and muster were activated because the facility was already shut in and the only 2 personnel on board were at the scene of the incident. At approximately 1900 hours, operators from GI 37 R arrived by boat. At 2000 hours, a plan was made to put a water hose with potable water in the top of still column to put the fire out which was successful.

In October of 2023, the still column of the Reboiler was sent in to a construction yard for repair. The glycol outlet into the still column was corroded. Once returned, Cantium construction crew reassembled the unit. Immediately after the gas dehydration unit was placed back in service the still column clogged with sludge. The clog appears to be due to the still column not being cleaned enough and when ceramic saddles were replaced from being broke at the bottom of still column. Cantium crews then proceeded to disassemble the still column and removed the 1" ceramic saddles that make up the packing section of the still column. Cantium then reassembled the still column and brought the unit back online.

BSEE was notified on January 30, 2024, of a fire a that occurred on the Glycol Reboiler. BSEE investigation team arrived on location the following day. The investigation team gathered witness statements, walked down the glycol system, and took pictures. The team saw no visible damage to the outside of the glycol system. Through Ewell correspondence, the BSEE investigator requested the third party analysis of the still column and Cantium's Final Investigation Report.

Cantium's path forward is to send the still column back in to be thoroughly cleaned and to replace the packer section perforated plate. Cantium is going to replace the perforated metal plate with expanded metal in order to help with flow through the packing section.

In conclusion, BSEE agrees with third party analysis. The probable cause is that the packing section was not reinstalled in the still column. Without the packing section, it removes the ability to preheat the glycol which allows for entrained gases to be released into the Reboiler. Even with the packing missing from the Reboiler, the plate for the packer can cause a sufficient restriction which would allow the PSV to relieve.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Human error- Packing section was not reinstalled properly.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Equipment Failure- Flawed equipment design of perforated plate inside of the still column instead of expanded metal.

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

None

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED: NATURE OF DAMAGE:

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Still Column For Public Release

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$40,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

N/A

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

N/A

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION: 28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

30-JAN-2024

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED:

NO

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members:

OCS REPORT:

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE: NO

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Amy Pellegrin

APPROVED

DATE: 27-JUN-2024

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