UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT GULF OF MEXICO REGION

For Public Release

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1.	OCCURREDSIDATE:03-OCT-2024TIME:0900HOURSCIOPERATOR:Shell Offshore Inc.DDREPRESENTATIVE:XIITELEPHONE:HIMHIMCONTRACTOR:Helmerich & PayneRIREPRESENTATIVE:SITELEPHONE:O'TELEPHONE:O'	TRUCTURAL DAMAGE RANE THER LIFTING AMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. NCIDENT >\$25K Damaged Buss Bars/Main Breaker 2S/15MIN./20PPM EQUIRED MUSTER HUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE THER
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	8. OPERATION:
4.	LEASE: G17565 AREA: AC LATITUDE: BLOCK: 857 LONGITUDE:	DRILLING PERM ABAND WORKOVER DECOM PIPELINE COMPLETION DECOM FACILITY HELICOPTER SITE CLEARANCE MOTOR VESSEL
5.	PLATFORM: A (Perdido) RIG NAME: H&P 205	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.
6.	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE) X DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD) DECOMMISSIONING	
-		9. CAUSE:
·/ .	TYPE: INJURIES: HISTORIC INJURY OPERATOR CONTRACTOR REQUIRED EVACUATION LTA (1-3 days) LTA (>3 days) RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days)	R EQUIPMENT FAILURE HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER
	FATALITY	10 אאיידים הבריינוי. 7935 בייד
	Other Injury	11. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 140 MI.
	POLLUTION FIRE EXPLOSION	12. WIND DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H.
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND SURFACE	13. CURRENT DIRECTION: SPEED: M.P.H. 14. SEA STATE: FT
	U DEVERTER	15. PICTURES TAKEN:
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <-=\$25K	16. STATEMENT TAKEN:

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17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On October 3, 2024, at approximately 9:00 am, an arc flash fire occurred on Lease G17565, Alaminos Canyon Block 857, on Shell's Perdido SPAR when a Silicon Controlled Rectifier (SCR) failed in the SCR house.

While conducting wireline logging operations, the H&P Drill Crew was using the cement pump to pump base oil into the GA017 well for hydrate mitigation. During the pumping operation the cement unit's electronic panel lost power. The Halliburton Cementer immediately notified the H&P 205's Rig Manager and Tool Pusher of the situation. The H&P Tool Pusher and Rig Electrician was dispatched to the SCR room to investigate. When the Tool Pusher and Rig Electrician entered the East side entrance to the SCR room, they heard a loud popping sound and observed smoke coming from the West side of the SCR room. The H&P Drill Crew was advised by the H&P Tool Pusher to secure the well and all rig power was shut down. The well was secured in four minutes and well operations were suspended to allow investigation into the power failure and the observed smoke in the SCR room. The fire crew was assembled and put on standby outside the SCR house for 30 minutes. The rig fire and gas alarm system did not indicate a fire had occurred in the SCR house. The fire was only identified when personnel entered the SCR house. The Rig Electrician began troubleshooting the power failure and identified evidence of arcing between the DC buss bars, arcing on the circuit breaker heat sinks, and a failed buss insulator in SCR cabinet #1. The electrician did not find evidence of any loose, unsecured connections or foreign objects which would have caused excessive heat. SCR cabinet #1 was isolated from the system for repair and the rest of the SCR system was returned to normal operating condition.

BSEE Investigators conducted an onsite inspection on October 7, 2024, and reviewed the alarm log, electrical schematics, monthly and semiannual SCR maintenance schedules, maintenance history, and thermal imaging scans of components. SCR system was installed in 2002. All inspections and maintenance were completed and up to date according to the maintenance records. The thermal imaging scans did not include a scan of the SCR cabinet's internals under load due to safety concerns of a high voltage circuit. A thermal imaging scan of the closed SCR cabinet from the outside could not have identified internal component failure because the cabinet is designed to dissipate any heat generated on the inside. The thermal image would only reflect the external cabinet temperature.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Internal component failure. Buss Insulator.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

Age of equipment

20. LIST THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

None

21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

Fire

SCR cabinet #1

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$25,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

None

23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO

24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

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25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGA	TION:
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28. ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION:

07-OCT-2024

26. Investigation Team Members/Panel Members: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO Dylan Mire / David Kearns /

27. OPERATOR REPORT ON FILE:

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

Stephen Martinez

APPROVED 27-DEC-2024 DATE:

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