UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

1.	OCCURRED					
	DATE: 14-OCT-2009 TIME: 0945 HOURS	STRUCTURAL DAMAGE				
2.	OPERATOR: Hilcorp Energy GOM, LLC REPRESENTATIVE: Walker, Julie TELEPHONE: (713) 289-2806 CONTRACTOR: Flow Petroleum Services, Inc. REPRESENTATIVE: Mire, Darren TELEPHONE: (337) 289-0922	OTHER LIFTING DEVICE DAMAGED/DISABLED SAFETY SYS. INCIDENT >\$25K H2S/15MIN./20PPM REQUIRED MUSTER SHUTDOWN FROM GAS RELEASE OTHER				
3.	OPERATOR/CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:	6. OPERATION:				
	LEASE: 00205 AREA: VR LATITUDE: BLOCK: 38 LONGITUDE:	X PRODUCTION DRILLING WORKOVER COMPLETION HELICOPTER MOTOR VESSEL				
5.	PLATFORM: E	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.XOTHERCompressor Engine				
	RIG NAME:	Maintenance				
	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION(POE) DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD) TYPE: HISTORIC INJURY X REQUIRED EVACUATION 1 LTA (1-3 days) X LTA (>3 days) RW/JT (1-3 days) RW/JT (>3 days)	Maintenance 8. CAUSE: EQUIPMENT FAILURE HUMAN ERROR EXTERNAL DAMAGE SLIP/TRIP/FALL WEATHER RELATED LEAK UPSET H20 TREATING OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID OTHER				
	Other Injury	9. WATER DEPTH: 36 FT.				
	FATALITY POLLUTION X FIRE	10. DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 9 MI.				
	LWC HISTORIC BLOWOUT UNDERGROUND	11. WIND DIRECTION: S SPEED: 10 M.P.H.				
	SURFACE DEVERTER SURFACE EQUIPMENT FAILURE OR PROCEDURES	12. CURRENT DIRECTION: S SPEED: 5 M.P.H.				
	COLLISION HISTORIC >\$25K <- \$25K	13. SEA STATE: 2 FT.				

17. INVESTIGATION FINDINGS:

On 14 October 2009 a Third Party Compressor Mechanic (Mechanic) initiated a Job Safety Analysis (JSA) to diagnose a problem with the fuel/air management system on a reciprocating gas compressor. Three other onboard Mechanics assisted in the process of troubleshooting the fuel/air management system and all signed the JSA. The compressor had to be started multiple times during the process and developed a problem with the starter. In the meantime, the Mechanic that developed the JSA departed the platform by helicopter and was not on the platform at the time the starter problem was discovered.

The three remaining Mechanics poured oil into the starter for lubrication purposes and oil bubbled out from the starter intake leading the Mechanics to believe there might be excessive pressure or a restriction in the exhaust piping. The exhaust piping was disconnected from the starter and the Mechanics then attempted to start the compressor by opening the manual start valve. The manual start valve was located approximately six feet from the starter. At this time, a large volume of gas vented from the starter exhaust piping and ignited, resulting in a flash fire that burned the right side of one of the attending Mechanic's face and right hand. The Mechanic was evacuated by helicopter and drove himself to the doctor.

Subsequent to the flash fire the starter was removed and inspected. The bendix and bearing showed signs of excessive wear and heat damage on the shaft. Evidence indicates that a possible ignition source was a spark generated from engagement of the starter bendix and the engine flywheel. The starter was replaced and exhaust piping reconnected prior to the Mechanics rolling the engine over without incident. Adjustments were then made to the fuel/air management unit as originally planned.

The JSA, prepared by the Mechanic not on the platform at the time of the incident, specifically addressed work to be done with respect to the fuel/air management unit without identifying the starter problem. No task-specific JSA was performed prior to removing the starter's exhaust piping.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

The possible ignition source was a spark generated from the engagement of the starter bendix and the engine flywheel while the exhaust piping was disconnected from the starter.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

* Personnel involved in the compressor project failed to exercise Stop Work Authority (SWA) and re-evaluate the job scope after the starter problem was discovered. * Without a task-specific JSA prior to removing the starter's exhaust piping, the associated hazards and mitigating measures were not identified.

* Personnel removed the gas compressor starter exhaust piping in lieu of disassembling the starter that could have allowed the damaged bendix and bearing on the inside of the starter housing to be discovered.

* Failure to thoroughly diagnose the possibility of a restriction in the starter exhaust piping by first installing a pressure gauge to observe the pressure on the line prevented personnel from safely ruling out the theory of excessive back pressure on the exhaust piping.

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21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

None

N/A

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL):

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

The Lake Charles District recommends that the MMS Regional Office of Safety Management (OSM) issue a Safety Alert to heighten industry's awareness of the hazards involved with not properly venting exhaust gas from gas operated engine starters.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: YES
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:

G-110 - Operator failed to perform operations in a safe and workmanlike manner, thus resulting in a flash fire and injury to the 3rd party mechanic.
* The JSA was not updated to include the change in job scope.
* Personnel removed the gas compressor starter exhaust piping in lieu of

disassembling the starter that could have allowed the damaged bendix and bearing on the inside of the starter housing to be discovered.

* Failure to thoroughly diagnose the possibility of a restriction in the starter exhaust piping by first installing a pressure gauge to observe the pressure on the line prevented personnel from safely ruling out the theory of excessive back pressure on the exhaust piping.

25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

15-OCT-2009

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS: 29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION Scott Mouton / Royce Buford / Wayne Meaux / Mike Jardell / OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

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PAGE: 3 OF 7 11-DEC-2009 Willard Smith Jr. /

D.Dykes for L. Williamson

APPROVED DATE: **24-NOV-2009**

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FIRE/EXPLOSION ATTACHMENT

1. SOURCE OF IGNITION: Believed to be spark from a damaged starter bendix

2.	TYPE	OF	FUEL:	x	GAS
					OIL
					DIESEL
					CONDENSATE
					HYDRAULIC
					OTHER

3. FUEL SOURCE: Gas starter exhaust piping was removed

4. WERE PRECAUTIONS OR ACTIONS TAKEN TO ISOLATE KNOWN SOURCES OF IGNITION PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT ? NO

5.	TYPE	OF	FIREFIGHTING	EQUIPMENT	UTILIZED:	x	HANDHELD
							WHEELED UNIT
							FIXED CHEMICAL
							FIXED WATER
							NONE
							OTHER

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE X OTHER 3rd party mechanic	x INJURY FATALITY WITNESS	
NAME: HOME ADDRESS: CITY: WORK PHONE: EMPLOYED BY:	STATE: TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE:	YEAR
BUSINESS ADDRESS: CITY: ZIP CODE:	STATE:	
 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER 3rd party mechanic 	INJURY FATALITY X WITNESS	
CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE	FATALITY	YEAR

INJURY/FATALITY/WITNESS ATTACHMENT

 OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE OTHER 3rd party mechanic 	INJURY FATALITY X WITNESS
NAME :	
HOME ADDRESS:	
CITY:	STATE:
WORK PHONE:	TOTAL OFFSHORE EXPERIENCE: YEARS
EMPLOYED BY:	
BUSINESS ADDRESS:	
CITY:	STATE:
ZIP CODE:	