## UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE GULF OF MEXICO REGION

## **ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**

1.	OCCURRED	8.	CAUSE: X EQUIPMENT FAILURE
	DATE: 17-FEB-2006 TIME: 1000 HOURS		x HUMAN ERROR
0			EXTERNAL DAMAGE
2.	OPERATOR: Samson Contour Energy E&P, LLC		SLIP/TRIP/FALL
			WEATHER RELATED
	REPRESENTATIVE: David Rudolph		☐ LEAK
	TELEPHONE: (713) 577-2005		UPSET H2O TREATING
2	LEASE: G01142		OVERBOARD DRILLING FLUID
٥.			X OTHER maintenance
	AREA: VR LATITUDE:	٥	WATER DEPTH: 120 FT.
	BLOCK: 218 LONGITUDE:		
4.	PLATFORM: <b>B</b>		DISTANCE FROM SHORE: 58 MI.
	RIG NAME	11.	WIND DIRECTION:
			SPEED: M.P.H.
5.	ACTIVITY: EXPLORATION (POE)	12.	CURRENT DIRECTION:
	DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION (DOCD/POD)		SPEED: M.P.H.
6	TYPE:   FIRE	13.	SEA STATE: FT.
٥.	TIPE: LIFTED		
	브		
	BLOWOUT	16	OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE/
	COLLISION	10.	SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:
	INJURY NO0		GARY HARTZ
	FATALITY NO0		CITY: STATE:
	POLLUTION		CIII. SIAIE.
	OTHER Crane boom failure		TELEPHONE:
7.	OPERATION: X PRODUCTION		CONTRACTOR: Wood Group Production Services
	□ DRILLING		
	☐ WORKOVER		
			CONTRACTOR REPRESENTATIVE/ SUPERVISOR ON SITE AT TIME OF INCIDENT:
	COMPLETION		
	MOTOR VESSEL		CITY: STATE:
	PIPELINE SEGMENT NO.		_ TELEPHONE:
	X OTHER PLATFORM SHUT IN S:	INCE	RITA

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## 17. DESCRIBE IN SEQUENCE HOW ACCIDENT HAPPENED:

The crane operator did state that he had problems with sticky levers previously on this crane. After review of work tickets and inspections, no information was found on problems with sticky levers

On February 17, 2006 the crane operator at Vr 218 was back loading an air compressor from the platform to the boat. The crane operator had performed his pre-use inspection earlier in the day.

The operator attached to the load and swung out over the water to let the load down on the boat that was tied off to the platform. The boat was a little too far away to complete the operation. At this time the operator swung the load to a safe location (away from boat, over water only) and exited the crane to go get a marine radio to make contact with the boat.

He exited the crane and went into the living quarters to find a radio. Within one to two minutes a construction hand hollered out that the crane was booming up. At this point the crane had reached its limits and the crane boom cradled. The boom fell forward and the attached load was submerged in the water.

## Investigation Findings:

The crane operator immediately shut off the engine. He did however state that "the boom winch was still engaged at the time that the engine was shut off."

After the engine was shut off, the crane operator found the "Boom Lever" was partially stuck in the "Boom Up" position. All operations were suspended at this time until an investigation could be performed.

On 2-21-06 a crane inspector was dispatched to the platform. He found that the "Boom Kickout Valve" was functioning mechanically, but a hydraulic function test cannot be performed at this time. He also found that the boom lever was sticking, that when you boom up or down the lever does not go back to neutral. He went on to say that there is a ring on the king post, where the boom stop that is on the heel, has struck the king post before. He knows this because paint is removed when the crane is swinging.

The tickets from the crane refurbish in 5-04 states that "boom kickout device was set and checked. The tickets from the last annual in 3-05 states that the "boom kickout device" was tested and was checked off as good.

18. LIST THE PROBABLE CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

STICKY BOOM LEVER. FAULTY BOOM KICKOUT DEVICE.

19. LIST THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE(S) OF ACCIDENT:

CRANE OPERATOR STARTED LIFT WITH NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE BOAT. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON PRECAUTIONS ON JSA.

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21. PROPERTY DAMAGED:

NATURE OF DAMAGE:

CRANE BOOM, CRANE PEDESTAL, DRIP PAN, CRANE BOOM CRADLED. TENSION. KING POST ASSEMBLY.

ESTIMATED AMOUNT (TOTAL): \$300,000

22. RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT RECURRANCE NARRATIVE:

No recommendations for MMS

MAKE COMMUNICATION AVAILABLE BEFORE LIFT IS STARTED. SHUT DOWN CRANE OPERATIONS IF ANY PROBLEMS ARE NOTICED. IE.STICKY CONTROLS.

- 23. POSSIBLE OCS VIOLATIONS RELATED TO ACCIDENT: NO
- 24. SPECIFY VIOLATIONS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING. NARRATIVE:
- 25. DATE OF ONSITE INVESTIGATION:

21-FEB-2006

26. ONSITE TEAM MEMBERS:

ERIC FONTENOT /

29. ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PANEL FORMED: NO

OCS REPORT:

30. DISTRICT SUPERVISOR:

FPausina for LWilliamson

APPROVED

DATE: 14-APR-2006

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