ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE AND FAILURE MECHANISMS FOR OFFSHORE STRUCTURES AND PIPELINES IN HURRICANES GUSTAV AND IKE

FINAL REPORT
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ABBREVIATIONS

ABAQUS	a finite element analysis software package
API	American Petroleum Institute
Bul	API abbreviation for Bulletin
CE	Carbon Equivalent
CGF	Conductor Guide Framing
CBD	Consequence Based Design
FEA	finite element analysis
HD	Horizontal Diagonal
H_{max}	Maximum Wave Height
HZ	Horizontal Brace
MMS	Minerals Management Service
NTL	Notice To Lessees
OOC	Offshore Operators Committee
OSTS	Office of Structural and Technical Support
RP	API abbreviation for Recommended Practice
RP2A	API Recommended Practice 2A for Planning, Designing and Constructing Fixed Offshore Platforms, 21st Edition
RP 2TD	API Recommended Practice on Guidelines for Tie-downs on Offshore Production Facilities for Hurricane Season
SACS	(Structural Analysis Computer System) is a finite element structural analysis suite of programs for the offshore and civil engineering industries.
Section 2	Section within RP 2A 21st Edition that covers design of new platforms
Section 17	Section within RP 2A 21st Edition that covers assessment of existing platforms
ULS	Ultimate Limit Strength
VD	Vertical Diagonal
WID	Wave In Deck

See also Table 7.1 for special pipeline related acronyms.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Saffir-Simpson Intensity Scale (SSI) – 1-5 category rating based on a hurricane's sustained wind intensity and its potential for damage to shore side infrastructure.

Forristall Distribution – A probabilistic distribution used to describe the maximum wave height during a storm

CONVERSIONS

1 foot (ft) = 0.305 meters (m)
1 mile (mi) = 1.609 kilometers (km)
1 knot (kn) = 0.514 meters/second (m/s)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hurricanes Gustav and Ike affected approximately 3,000 platforms and thousands of miles of pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) during the fall of 2008. This report represents a comprehensive study of the performance of fixed and floating platforms and pipelines in Gustav and Ike. While most of these performed adequately, numerous platforms and pipelines were destroyed or damaged.

The overall findings, as in past studies, indicate that there was no life-loss or major environmental problems as a direct result of the hurricanes. This is attributable to the prior evacuation of the platforms and to the use of sub-surface safely valves and shut-in of wells prior to the hurricane arrival.

This project has evaluated large amounts of data and information related to how fixed and floating platforms and pipelines performed in hurricanes Gustav and Ike. Some of these evaluations and findings were similar to other studies of platform and pipeline performance in hurricanes.

The following summarizes specific key results and associated recommendations identified by this study. The description is intentionally brief since this is a summary of prior discussion elsewhere in this report. See the indicated section for full details. The findings are listed in relative order of importance for Platforms or Pipelines.

Platforms:

1. Performance of Tripod Platforms.
Result – There were five recent vintage tripods destroyed during Gustav and Ike, a surprisingly high number. One was an L-1 structure and 4 were L-2 structures. While tripods lack redundancy, offering little in way of alternative load paths in the event they are damaged, they also are also more dynamically sensitive especially in deeper waters (i.e., greater than 200 feet). See Section 4.4.
Recommendation – Further investigation into the tripod failures, and damage where data is available. Limits on the use of tripods in deeper water should be considered as well as a “robustness” check to ensure that the tripod can still function adequately should it sustain damage to the jacket or foundation.

2. Platform Robustness.
Result – Numerous platforms experienced storm conditions greater than 50 year L-2 and 100 year L-1 design practice. While most performed as expected or better since they experienced an event larger than their design, it is clear that offshore structures require “robustness” that not only allows them to survive, but perhaps sustain damage if the elastic design event is exceeded. While the 50 or 100 year design approach provides inherent factors of safety, additional checks are required to ensure that the platform will survive extreme conditions. For example, checks for efficient load paths and redundancy. See Section 5.2.1.

Recommendation – A second check be performed during the initial design of offshore platforms to ensure they will survive extreme hurricanes such as Ike, that may exceed the platform elastic design criteria. This is especially important for High Consequence platforms. See Item 5 below.

3. Performance of Floating Structures.

Result – Deepwater floating structures performed well in both hurricanes with only one structure suffering major damage due to a toppled drill rig. There was minor damage to other structures, mostly from high winds and wave run-up on the structure.
Recommendation – Operators should follow API guidance on tie-down of rigs, such as RP 2TD, especially on floating structures which have large motions in hurricanes.

4. Performance of A-2 manned-evacuated platforms.

Result – The majority of the A-2 manned-evacuated platforms that were destroyed experienced metocean conditions equal to, but predominately larger than, the Section 17 A-2 Ultimate Strength Criteria. On average these platforms experienced conditions 5 to 10 feet greater than this criteria. This finding confirms that these structures which could be manned during a Sudden Hurricane and should be able to withstand the API defined Sudden Hurricane conditions. See Section 5.2.1.
Recommendation – API is still investigating the Sudden Hurricane conditions and if they have changed then the findings of this report need to be reconfirmed. Initial indications are that the Sudden Hurricane conditions are the same as before Ike and Gustav and even Katrina and Rita.

5. Performance of L-1 platforms

Result - There was one L-1 platform that was destroyed during Ike which was a deepwater tripod. As no damage data was available for this study, the number of damaged L-1 platforms, if any, is unknown. L-1 represents the High Consequence API exposure category for fixed platforms and also the latest API approach for metocean loading including design to 100 year conditions. Much like Katrina and Rita, Gustav and Ike essentially "proof loaded" these platforms to loads at or above the L-1 criteria and the majority of platforms survived. This validates the L-1 design approach. See Section 5.2.1 and Item 1 above.
Recommendation – As a result of over 50% of these platforms seeing conditions greater than the 100 year design and it is recommended robustness checks in Item 2 above be performed on new High Consequence structures in order to ensure they will survive extreme hurricanes.

6. Pancake Leg Damage.

Result: To date there have been 21 documented cases of this type of damage. In most cases the D/t ratio was over 60 and the average thickness transition between joint can and nominal leg was 5/8 inches. It is likely that several of the destroyed platforms had this issue which ultimately resulted in their destruction. See Section 5.2.3.
Recommendation: Additional study is recommended to better understand this type of damage and modify the new platform design process accordingly (e.g., establish D/t limits for legs). In addition, guidelines should be developed to determine if an existing platform is susceptible

to this problem (e.g., thin walled legs) and recommendations developed to prevent the problem from occurring, such as grouting the legs.

7. Crest Comparison to Required Deck Height.
Result: Over 40% of the platforms exposed were expected to see wave in deck if their deck height was set at the recommended API deck height. The majority of these are classified as A-2 platforms and their deck heights are checked per Section 17 based on Sudden Hurricane conditions which are much less than 100 year conditions. In contrast, High Consequence L-1 and A-1 platforms and Medium Consequence L-2 platforms which have their deck elevations established according to 100 year conditions, had a low percentage of platforms that would have expected to see WID. See Section 5.2.2.
Recommendation: The API A-2 deck elevation curves are an indicator if a platform will survive a sudden hurricane, but they are not a good indicator if the platform will be damaged or destroyed in larger hurricanes. Platform owners should be educated on the destruction or damage and associated potential downtime that can occur for platforms that have low decks, especially A-2 platforms, or when critical production or other equipment and systems are located on lower decks that can be impacted by waves. Consideration should be given to relocate such equipment to higher decks.

8. Foundations.
Result: Numerous leaning platforms were observed including several with suspected pile foundation failures. These were some of the first documented pile foundation failures in hurricanes. In terms of vintage, the majority of the observations were of recent design and installed in the last 10 years, with more tripods contributing to the structure type. See Item 1 above and Section 6.1.2.
Recommendation: The guidance in MMS TAR Study 612 which provides an in-depth study of the performance of foundations in hurricanes, including Ike, should be followed for platform design and assessment. In particular, the document provides an improved approach for assessment of the foundations of existing platforms as well as guidance to include pile flexibility in determining pile penetration for new platform design.

9. Crown Shims.
Result: Several jacket pile shim connections failed and proved to be the “weak link” in the platform design. The majority of these failures are attributed to an overloaded connection that was poorly designed. It is likely that this is the initiating flaw in several of the destroyed platforms. See Section 6.1.2.
Recommendation: It is recommended further study be performed to provide improved guidance on design of this connection for both strength and fatigue (low cycle, high stress) for new platforms. The guidance should also include an approach to determine if an existing platform has this type of flaw so that corrective action can be taken.

Pipelines:

1. Performance of Pipelines and Risers.

Result: Numerous pipelines and risers experienced movements similar to prior hurricanes. More risers were damaged in Ike than Katrina. Bottom currents were larger than predicted in some cases and perhaps the reason for numerous pipeline movements. See Section 7.4

Recommendation: Apply the new modeling and calibration work for storm surges and currents to predict the loads on pipelines and risers, to assess the potential for damage, and to compare the predictions with observations.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Hurricanes Gustav and Ike impacted over 3,000 platforms and thousands of miles of pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) during 2008. Gustav was a fast moving storm that made landfall in the central region of the GOM near Cocodrie, Louisiana and resulted in minimal platform destruction and damage, although several pipelines were damaged likely as a result of mudslides. In contrast, Ike was a slow moving storm that moved across a large portion of the GOM Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) before it made landfall near Galveston, Texas. Ike's path was similar to that of hurricane Rita in 2005, and similar to Rita, Ike destroyed and damaged a large number of platforms and pipelines. There was no life loss and no significant pollution in either Gustav or Ike.

1.2 Objectives

The objectives are to catalogue and evaluate platform and pipeline damage and destruction caused by hurricanes Gustav and Ike. Both fixed and floating platforms are considered here.

The work evaluated technically what went right and what went wrong in order to identify issues that can be changed in design codes so these problems do not occur again on new structures (platforms and pipelines) or to identify issues with existing infrastructure that can be identified in advance and remedied prior to future hurricanes. Part of the work scope includes identification of common mitigation methods that can be used to repair damaged structures or can be used proactively to prevent destruction and minimize damage in future hurricanes.

This information is beneficial to the MMS and industry to further understand how platforms and pipelines perform in extreme hurricanes so that changes can be input to design standards to improve performance.

Recommendations are made related to specific items that the MMS and the offshore industry, particularly API, may consider in terms of advanced preparation and response to future hurricanes.

1.3 Project Team

The project was performed and managed by Energo Engineering of Houston, Texas. Mr. Frank Puskar, PE, was the Principal Investigator. Mr. Puskar was also the Principal Investigator for the similar Andrew, Lili, Ivan and Katrina and Rita studies. Mr. Sean Verret of Energo was the Lead Engineer for the study. Other Energo staff assisted on the project as necessary.

The University of Texas (UT) at Austin also worked on the project via Dr. Robert Gilbert, assisted by Mrs. Jeongyeon Cheon and Mr. Jiun-Yih Chen. Dr. Gilbert is well known in the offshore industry for his work in reliability, specifically foundations. UT provided analysis and input of the performance of pile foundations and pipeline assessments.

Participating from the MMS were Mr. B.J. Kruse, Mr. Alex Alvarado, Ms. Lori Medley (COTR), Mr. Sid Falk, Ms. Vanessa Bertrand, and Mr. Jason Mathews.

The project was conducted from May 2009 to February 2010.

2.0 HURRICANE CHARACTERISTICS

2.1 Path of Hurricanes

Figure 2.1 shows the GOM in the vicinity of the OCS offshore platform and pipeline infrastructure. Each platform is represented by a dot and each pipeline is represented by a black line. The paths of the eye of Gustav and Ike are shown including the associated Saffir-Simpson Intensity Scale (SSI) category of the hurricane at different locations in the GOM. The figure also shows the western and eastern boundaries of the MMS requirement to perform a post-hurricane inspection according to NTL 2008-G18.

2.2 Hurricane Gustav Storm Characteristics

Gustav formed from a tropical wave that moved westward from the coast of Africa on August 13, 2008. From that wave, a tropical depression formed August 25 about 110 miles northeast of Bonaire in the Netherland Antilles. The storm rapidly intensified and became a tropical storm near August 25 and then a Category 1 hurricane August 26. Gustav then weakened slightly before making landfall on the southwestern peninsula of Haiti that day. The center of Gustav crossed the peninsula and the hurricane weakened to a tropical storm by early August 27. On August 28, the storm moved southward and the maximum winds increased to 60 kt. The storm then turned west-northwestward on August 29 and emerged from the western end of Jamaica.

The storm then began a northwestward motion that would continue until its final landfall. The storm intensified over the warm water of the northwestern Caribbean Sea and regained hurricane status late on August 29, quickly becoming a Category 2 hurricane as it moved through the Cayman Islands on August 30. It rapidly intensified to a Category 4 hurricane before it made landfall on the eastern coast of the Isle of Youth, Cuba, that day. Gustav weakened over Cuba, and it continued to weaken over the Gulf of Mexico on August 31. The hurricane grew in size as it crossed the oil and gas producing areas (primarily the Mississippi Canyon, West Delta, South Timbalier areas), of the Gulf of Mexico as a Category 3 storm. By September 1, hurricane-force winds extended roughly 80 miles from the center of the storm. Gustav made its final landfall near Cocodrie, Louisiana, on September 1 as a strong Category 2 storm.

2.3 Hurricane Ike Storm Characteristics

Ike originated from a tropical wave that moved off the west coast of Africa on August 28, 2008 and grew into a tropical depression by September 1, about 775 miles west of the Cape Verde Islands. The depression quickly strengthened to a tropical storm and then gradually intensified over the next two days as it moved west-northwestward over the tropical Atlantic.

On September 3, an eye became apparent and Ike became a hurricane when it was centered about 700 miles east-northeast of the northern Leeward Islands. After Ike reached its peak intensity, an upper-level high located northwest of the hurricane over the western Atlantic began to strengthen and contributed to wind shear, causing the cloud pattern to become asymmetric. The hurricane turned the west on September 4 and then redeveloped and quickly returned to Category 4 status on September 6. Ike then weakened slightly to Category 3 status before making landfall in the southeastern Bahamas September 7. Ike weakened a little more but once again re-strengthened to Category 4 status on Sept 8 and made landfall at that intensity in Cuba. Ike gradually lost strength, emerging over the waters of the northwestern Caribbean Sea as a Category 1 hurricane. Over the next day or so, Ike moved westward and maintained its status as a Category 1 hurricane, making a second landfall in Cuba on September 9.

Ike's interaction with Cuba caused much of the hurricane's inner core to become disrupted, and the wind field expanded as the hurricane moved into the Gulf of Mexico. The storm moved slowly northwestward on September 10 over the southeastern Gulf, but did not rapidly intensify, strengthening to barely a Category 2 on September 10. In addition, the extent of hurricane force winds increased, reaching as far as 115 miles from the center. At this point, Hurricane Ike was well within the producing regions where most of the platforms are located. On September 12, Ike turned back to the west-northwest then turned to the northwest towards the upper Texas coast (Ike's path passed directly through the Garden Bank and High Island areas but affected platforms in many more areas). Ike turned to the north-northwest, and its center made landfall along the north end of Galveston Island, Texas, on September 13, 2008. At landfall, Ike had strengthened to a strong Category 2 hurricane with maximum winds at 95 kt. The hurricane's center continued up through Galveston Bay, just east of Houston, then northward across eastern Texas. Ike weakened to a tropical storm by September 13 just east of Palestine, Texas.



Figure 2.1 Paths of Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and the Gulf of Mexico Offshore Infrastructure.
The dots and lines indicate specific platforms and pipeline infrastructure.
All platforms located within the NTL boundaries had to be inspected following the hurricanes per MMS NTL 2008-G18
The SSI Category of the hurricanes at selected locations is also shown.

3.0 DATA COLLECTION

The project team was tasked with obtaining all the data available for both platforms (fixed and floating) and pipelines (risers included). There were three key sources of data used for the project. The first was the MMS files, which supplied a majority of the data used for this study. The second was supplied data via contacts made by the Project Team with specific operators requesting information about their platforms and pipelines. The third was from data available in the public domain. All of this data was held confidential by Project and the results put into a generic format as reported throughout this document.

Shortly following Hurricane Ike, the MMS issued NTL 2008-G18 that required API RP2A Level I above water and Level II underwater inspections of all platforms to the east of approximately Galveston (The NTL boundaries are shown in Figure 2.1). This area included 3,185 of the approximately 4,000 offshore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, including all platforms in offshore Louisiana (not including platforms in state waters). Operators submitted the results of these inspections to the MMS and some of this data was used for the study. Note that the number of exposed platforms was actually 3,245, but since 60 were destroyed, only 3,185 had to be inspected.

Platform configuration data was also available to the study via the MMS files, such as water depth, year installed, number of legs, cellar deck elevation, etc. The combination of the post-hurricane inspection data and the platform configuration data provided a useful set of information to understand how platforms performed in the hurricanes.

The Gustav and Ike hurricane conditions data used in the study were based on a hindcast of each hurricane developed and acquired from Oceanweather [Oceanweather, 2008]. The hindcasts are proprietary information that must be acquired directly from Oceanweather and only limited hindcast condition data is shown in this study. In some cases, the platform Operator provided to the study a more detailed specific hindcast of the hurricane conditions at their platform or pipeline location.

Some of the data was supplied via operators directly to the Project Team via summary tables, inspection reports, engineering reports, and interviews. In several cases, this was to obtain clarification of data obtained via the MMS. This data was also appropriately sanitized.

4.0 DATA EVALUATION - DESTROYED PLATFORMS

This section describes the destroyed platforms including their characteristics and general trends. The majority of the data collected for this study was mainly related to the destroyed platforms. Some limited data was collected on the damaged platforms and is discussed in Section 6.0.

4.1 Number of Platforms Destroyed

There were a total of 60 destroyed fixed platforms in Gustav and Ike as officially reported by the MMS [MMS, 2008]. No floating platforms were destroyed. Table 4.1 shows the list of the destroyed fixed platforms defined by the MMS as well as additional information on each platform added to the list by this study. The list includes specific details such as year installed, water depth, deck elevation, Gustav or Ike wave hindcast conditions, etc. The hurricane wave conditions are based on the Oceanweather hindcasts previously noted. This table is discussed in more detail in later sections of this document.

In many cases it was clearly evident that a platform was destroyed, such as completely toppled leaving nothing remaining above the sea surface or severely leaning or damaged. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 show examples of heavily damaged platforms that were still standing above the waterline, but were considered destroyed. These three platforms experienced hurricane wave inundation (wave-in-deck) in their decks. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show a side-scan sonar image and an Echoscope survey image, respectively, of a toppled platform that is lying on the seafloor.

It is difficult to arrive at a firm number of destroyed platforms as a result of these hurricanes. This is because in some cases, a platform may have been damaged and the owner requires additional time to determine if it is economical to replace the platform. In other cases, the damage may not have been found in the initial inspection, and when located, the owner may elect to remove the platform at a later date. In other words, the platform may never restart production or its other operations after the hurricanes. In a certain sense, these platforms can also be termed destroyed by the hurricanes. However, it was decided to freeze the number of destroyed platforms based upon the official list of destroyed platforms published by the MMS in November 2008. This list contained a total of 60 destroyed fixed platforms as shown in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 List of Platforms Destroyed by Ike and Gustav

Hurricane	Platform Name	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned/ Evacuated[1]	Structure Type	API Category[2]	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax[3](ft)	Local Crest[3](ft)
Gustav	ST-21 G-A	1963	41	N	TRI	A-3	30.2	43.0	24.0
Ike	EC-229-A	1971	115	N	4-P	A-1	39.8	63.5	42.8
Ike	EC-265-GP-Valve	1971	172	N	4-P	A-1	61.0	67.7	46.6
Ike	EC-272-C	1972	182	Y	4-P	A-2	46.0	68.3	46.9
Ike	EC-272-C-Aux1	1972	182	Y	4-P	A-2	45.9	68.3	46.9
Ike	EC-272-D	1972	188	Y	4-P	A-2	46.0	68.5	47.0
Ike	EC-272-D-Aux1	1972	188	Y	4-P	A-2	46.0	68.5	47.0
Ike	EC-272-E	1974	188	Y	4-P	A-2	46.0	68.5	47.0
Ike	EC-272-H	1984	185	N	4-P	A-2	49.3	68.3	47.0
Ike	EC-281-A	1975	175	Y	4-P	A-2	42.8	67.5	46.4
Ike	EC-281-A-Aux	1975	175	Y	4-P	A-2	45.0	67.5	46.4
Ike	EC-328-A	1994	243	Y	4-P	A-2	Unknown	70.5	47.2
Ike	EC-330-A	1985	255	N	4-P	A-2	47.0	70.3	46.8
Ike	EC-364-A	2000	373	N	TRI	L-2	49.9	72.9	46.5
Ike	EI-119-7	1962	37	N	CAS	A-3	33.0	Unknown	Unknown
Ike	EI-125-7	1999	40	N	CAS	A-3	25.0	Unknown	Unknown
Ike	EI-175-E	1957	85	N	4-P	A-3	48.6	52.5	34.3
Ike	EI-179-C	1967	96	N	4-P	Unknown	Unknown	55.1	36.6
Ike	EI-258-G	1992	155	N	CAS	A-2	47.3	62.4	42.8
Ike	EI-266-E	1969	167	N	6-P	A-2	39.5	65.2	44.7
Ike	EI-267-I	1980	176	N	4-P	A-2	37.5	66.2	45.4
Ike	EI-268-A	2003	190	N	TRI	L-2	Unknown	67.9	46.4
Ike	EI-288-A	2001	202	N	TRI	L-2	53.9	68.9	47.0
Ike	EI-292-B	1969	210	N	8-P	A-2	42.0	69.7	47.4
Ike	EI-296-B-Prod	1972	214	Y	8-P	A-2	44.4	69.2	46.9
Ike	EI-302-A	2002	224	N	TRI	L-2	49.9	69.7	47.1
Ike	EI-330-A	1971	244	N	8-P	A-2	43.0	72.7	48.9
Ike	EI-330-C	1972	254	N	8-P	A-2	45.5	73.0	49.0
Ike	EI-331-A	1972	246	N	8-P SK	A-1	40.0	72.8	48.9
Ike	EI-339-B	1973	260	N	8-P	A-2	50.5	73.8	49.3
Ike	EI-339-C	1974	268	N	8-P	A-2	49.5	74.2	49.4
Ike	EI-349-A	1974	320	N	8-P SK	A-2	33.8	75.0	49.2
Ike	EI-371-B	1987	415	N	4-P SK	A-2	49.5	78.8	50.0
Ike	EI-390-A	1996	350	N	TRI	A-2	71.0	81.6	51.0
Ike	EI-397-A	2002	472	N	TRI	L-1	49.0	83.3	51.7
Ike	EW-947-A	1990	477	Y	4-P	A-2	58.0	78.5	47.8
Ike	SM-48-B-Prod	1965	107	N	4-P	A-2	39.0	56.0	37.4
Ike	SM-49-F	1978	98	N	4-P	A-2	44.0	55.8	37.2
Ike	SS-154-I	1965	62	N	6-P	A-2	42.0	50.6	30.1
Ike	SS-208-F	1964	97	N	8-P	Unknown	Unknown	58.3	38.3
Ike	SS-253-A	1962	187	Y	4-P	A-1	42.0	64.3	44.1
Ike	SS-274-T-27-Valve	1972	213	N	4-P	A-1	42.0	68.1	46.2
Ike	SS-291-B	1993	235	N	TRI	A-2	48.1	69.5	46.8
Ike	ST-148-Cais B	1997	104	N	B-CAS	A-2	54.1	57.5	38.0

The table is continued on the next page.

Hurricane	Platform Name	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned/ Evacuated[1]	Structure Type	API Category[2]	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax[3](ft)	Local Crest[3](ft)
Ike	ST-175-T-22-Valve	1972	135	N	4-P	A-1	46.0	60.1	40.9
Ike	ST-195-A	1988	100	N	4-P	A-2	48.0	60.4	40.7
Ike	ST-196-A	1971	105	Y	4-P	A-2	41.0	59.4	39.2
Ike	VR-122-B	2003	76	N	B-CAS	L-2	Unknown	54.1	34.3
Ike	VR-131-14	1979	57	N	4-P	A-3	32.0	46.9	28.4
Ike	VR-201-B	2008	110	N	B-CAS	2DG-L-2	Unknown	61.8	40.9
Ike	VR-217-C	1993	121	N	TRI	A-2	Unknown	62.2	42.0
Ike	VR-217-F	2006	123	N	B-CAS	L-2	Unknown	62.4	42.2
Ike	VR-267-C	1971	169	N	8-P	A-2	42.9	67.1	46.1
Ike	VR-281-A	1997	176	Y	TRI	A-1	Unknown	68.0	46.8
Ike	VR-284-A	1990	186	Y	4-P	A-2	53.0	68.8	47.2
Ike	VR-320-C	1998	207	N	TRI	A-2	55.3	70.2	47.9
Ike	VR-329-A	1977	220	N	4-P	A-2	45.8	72.1	48.9
Ike	VR-386-B	1979	324	Y	4-P	A-2	47.8	73.6	47.8
Ike	WC-248-2	1990	80	N	CAS	A-3	52.3	57.8	35.5
Ike	WC-473-A	1996	130	N	B-CAS	A-2	53.5	62.3	42.6

1. Manned/Evacuated refers to API's category for life safety. The "Y" implies the platform is usually manned; however, it will be evacuated during a design event such as a hurricane. The "N" implies the platform is not normally manned.
2. API Category provided by Operator to MMS
3. Based on the greater of Gustav and Ike hindcast values.

Figure 4.1 Destroyed Platform in the Eugene Island Area

Figure 4.2 Destroyed Platform in the Eugene Island Area



Figure 4.3 Destroyed Platform in the East Cameron Area



Figure 4.4 Side Scan Sonar of a Destroyed Platform in the Ewing Banks Area



Figure 4.5 Echoscope Survey of a Destroyed Platform in the Ewing Banks Area

4.2 Destroyed Platforms by Location

Figure 4.6 shows the destroyed platform locations in relation to the paths of the eye of the hurricanes. Also shown is the relative size of the hurricanes at selected locations based upon the SSI Hurricane Category.

Ike destroyed the majority of the platforms with only one destroyed platform being attributed to Gustav (the platform to the right of the Gustavo path). This may be because in prior years, Hurricanes Andrew (1992) and Katrina (2005) went through the general region of Gustav either destroying or severely damaging numerous platforms. All destroyed platforms were located to the east of the eye paths, as expected, since the east side of an Atlantic Hurricane contains the highest winds and waves.

In general, there seems to be no clear correlation of the eye path and distance to the destroyed platform or location. If all platforms were of equal strength, then this indeed may be the case since metocean conditions are greatest near the eye path. However, the destruction is primarily based upon a combination of hurricane conditions and the platform strength, which varies by location.



Figure 4.6 Location of Destroyed Platforms Compared to Path of Hurricanes.
The red dots indicate destroyed platforms. The SSI Category of the hurricanes at select locations is also indicated. Note that some locations have multiple dots on top of each other where destroyed platforms were closely located. All platforms were destroyed by Ike except for the one platform to the right of the Gustav path.

4.3 Destroyed Platforms by Vintage

This section discusses the number of platforms destroyed according to install date or “vintage”. API RP2A was first introduced in 1969. Prior to the 1st edition, asset owners had no recommended practice to follow. In the years leading up to the 1st Edition industry experienced several storms that lead to forming a group to develop recommended practices such as RP 2A based on their lessons learned. Table 4.2 shows all major storms that occurred since platforms were installed in the Gulf of Mexico, the estimated number of platforms destroyed and industry’s response.

Table 4.2 Hurricanes and Industry response

No.	Hurricane	Year	Structures Destroyed**	Industry Response or Source
1	Grand Isle	1948	2*	Limited number of platforms in service
2	Carla	1961	3*	
3	Hilda	1964	14*	Several operators start to use a 100 year return period design wave
4	Betsy	1965	8*	
5	Camille	1969	3*	1st ed. API RP2A for fixed platform design
6	Carmen	1974	2*	
7	Frederic	1979	3*	Wave load recipe provided in RP2A
8	Juan	1985	3*	Assess-Inspect-Maintain (AIM) Joint Industry Projects for existing platforms
9	Andrew	1992	28 / 47 / 75	PMB, Andrew JIP, 1996.
10	Lili	2002	8 / 0 /8	Puskar, et.al., OTC 16802, 2004.
11	Ivan	2004	6 /1 / 7	MMS TAR No. 549, Energo, 2006
12	Katrina	2005	45 / 0 / 45	MMS TAR No. 578, Energo, 2007.
13	Rita	2005	56 / 18 / 74	MMS TAR No. 578, Energo, 2007
14	Gustav	2008	1 /0 / 1	MMS New Release November 2008
15	Ike	2008	50 / 9 / 59	MMS News Release November 2008
Total Historical GOM			**232 / 75 / 307**	

* Platform failures based upon published reports at the time (no data on caissons). Additional failures may have occurred but not reported in literature.
** Data shown as Platforms / Caissons / Total

Figure 4.7 illustrates the number of platforms destroyed during Gustav and Ike sorted by the decade the platform was installed. Figure 4.8 shows the total number of platforms exposed during Gustav and Ike sorted by the decade the platform was installed (excluding platforms with an unknown API category). Shown on both of the Figures are the key dates and editions of API RP2A as previously discussed. Also shown are the platform’s API Category, discussed further in Section 5.1.

Figure 4.7 shows that the majority of the platforms destroyed were installed before the 1980’s. This trend continues to compare well with previous studies [Puskar, et.al 1994; Puskar, et.al, 2004; Puskar, et.al. 2006, Puskar, et.al. 2007].



Figure 4.7 Destroyed Platforms by Vintage and API Category



Figure 4.8 Exposed Platforms by Vintage and API Category
Excludes Platforms with an Unknown API Category

The 1960's and earlier platforms were designed and installed prior to any industry design standard. These platforms generally had low deck elevations, lacked strengthened connections (joint cans) and in some cases were designed to only a 25 year return period wave. The first edition of RP2A was developed and published in 1969, as shown by the box in the upper left hand side of the figure, and provided an improvement in both platform design and platform fabrication standards. However, several key ingredients were still missing, including guidance on minimum deck elevation, a consistent design recipe to determine wave loads, the lack of specific 100 year design wave heights and limited guidance on design of joints, member slenderness and other platform structural details. It is therefore no surprise that numerous 1970 vintage platforms, designed to these early RP2A standards, were also destroyed and damaged in Gustav and Ike [see also Energo, 2007].

Table 4.3 shows that there were 26 platforms destroyed that were installed post 1980. The table shows the details of these platforms including key platform and hurricane characteristics. These platforms represent a vintage of platforms designed to the post-9th edition of RP2A, published in 1977 as shown by the box in the upper middle of Figures 4.7 and 4.8, considered to be the time at which the RP2A platform design recipe had developed into a consistent and accurate approach. A key addition of the 9th edition was the inclusion of a specific wave load recipe including 100 year wave height criteria as a function of water depth. This allowed for a consistent design of all platforms to the same hurricane design loads.

However, while there is a clear difference in the number of destroyed platforms pre- and post-1980, there were still 26 platforms installed post 1980 that were destroyed. This is in part perhaps because the path of Ike was similar to the path of Hurricane Rita in 2005, as shown in Figure 4.9. Rita likely caused unaccounted or unaddressed platform damage to some platforms, with Ike passing through essentially the same the area three years later causing additional damage and resulting in destruction. Another reason may be since Ike, even though a Category 2 hurricane, exhibited an unusually large wind field, with hurricane force winds extending more than 100 miles from the eye, causing an increase in the overall wave height. This contributed to the many platforms which saw wave-in-deck, known to be detrimental to platforms, as discussed further in Section 5.



Figure 4.9 Hurricanes Ike and Rita Path Comparison
All existing platforms at the time of Hurricane Ike are shown for reference

When looking at platforms installed in the 1980s compared to the 1990s there is an increase in the number of destroyed platforms from 5 to 13, mostly consisting of A-2 structures. This is somewhat puzzling since it is generally thought that the 1980 and 1990 vintage platforms are similar in design and construction. One possibility is that a larger number of 1990s platforms were exposed to hurricane conditions that were greater than their design (this was not verifiable since actual design values were not available for all the platforms).

Lastly, there were 8 platforms destroyed that were installed from the year 2000 and later. This is surprising in that relatively “new” platforms such as these were destroyed. The installation date of the newest platform that was destroyed is 2008, although this particular platform was destroyed by a Jackup rig that was performing work next to the platform and collapsed onto it. The failure of these recent vintage platforms, predominately L-2s, is partly due to a change in the RP2A design approach that occurred in the late 1990s, that allowed L-2 platforms to be designed with 50 year return period hurricane conditions, compared to the 100 year return period conditions used for L-1 platforms. This is evidenced by the fact that there was only one L-1 platform that was destroyed; a tripod installed in 2002 which likely saw wave-in-deck. This change in the API design approach was known as Consequence Based Design (CBD) and is discussed further in Section 5.

Table 4.3 Destroyed Platforms – Post 1980 Installation

Hurricane	Platform Name	Year Installed	Water Depth (ft)	Manned/ Evacuated	Structure Type	API Category	Actual Deck Height (ft)	Hmax (ft)	Local Crest (ft)
Ike	EI-267-I	1980	176	N	4-P	A-2	37.5	66.2	45.4
Ike	EC-272-H	1984	185	N	4-P	A-2	49.3	68.3	47.0
Ike	EC-330-A	1985	255	N	4-P	A-2	47.0	70.3	46.8
Ike	EI-371-B	1987	415	N	4-P SK	A-2	49.5	78.8	50.0
Ike	ST-195-A	1988	100	N	4-P	A-2	48.0	60.4	40.7
Ike	EW-947-A	1990	477	Y	4-P	A-2	58.0	78.5	47.8
Ike	VR-284-A	1990	186	Y	4-P	A-2	53.0	68.8	47.2
Ike	WC-248-2	1990	80	N	CAS	A-3	52.3	57.8	35.5
Ike	EI-258-G	1992	155	N	CAS	A-2	47.3	62.4	42.8
Ike	SS-291-B	1993	235	N	TRI	A-2	48.1	69.5	46.8
Ike	VR-217-C	1993	121	N	TRI	A-2	Unknown	62.2	42.0
Ike	EC-328-A	1994	243	Y	4-P	A-2	Unknown	70.5	47.2
Ike	EI-390-A	1996	350	N	TRI	A-2	71.0	81.6	51.0
Ike	WC-473-A	1996	130	N	B-CAS	A-2	53.5	62.3	42.6
Ike	ST-148-Cais B	1997	104	N	B-CAS	A-2	54.1	57.5	38.0
Ike	VR-281-A	1997	176	Y	TRI	A-1	Unknown	68.0	46.8
Ike	VR-320-C	1998	207	N	TRI	A-2	55.3	70.2	47.9
Ike	EI-125-7	1999	40	N	CAS	A-3	25.0	Unknown	Unknown
Ike	EC-364-A	2000	373	N	TRI	L-2	49.9	72.9	46.5
Ike	EI-288-A	2001	202	N	TRI	L-2	53.9	68.9	47.0
Ike	EI-302-A	2002	224	N	TRI	L-2	49.9	69.7	47.1
Ike	EI-397-A	2002	472	N	TRI	L-1	49.0	83.3	51.7
Ike	EI-268-A	2003	190	N	TRI	L-2	Unknown	67.9	46.4
Ike	VR-122-B	2003	76	N	B-CAS	L-2	Unknown	54.1	34.3
Ike	VR-217-F	2006	123	N	B-CAS	L-2	Unknown	62.4	42.2
Ike	VR-201-B	2008	110	N	B-CAS	2DG-L-2	Unknown	61.8	40.9

Notes:

- VR 201 B was destroyed by a Jackup rig that was performing work on location.
- *Actual Deck Height* is the bottom of steel of the cellar deck as reported by the platform owner to the MMS.
- Some data is Unknown as indicated.
- *Hmax* is the maximum wave height at the location for the indicated hurricane determined by Oceanweather (2008).
- *Local Crest* is the estimated maximum crest elevation at the platform site. See Section 6 determined by Oceanweather (2008).
- *Manned/Evacuated* refers to API's category for life safety. The "Y" implies the platform is usually manned; however, it will be evacuated during a design event such as a hurricane. The "N" implies the platform is not normally manned.

4.4 Destroyed Platforms by Structure Type

Table 4.4 and Figure 4.10 show the destroyed and exposed platforms with known structure type. The figure also shows the exposed platforms (platforms located within the MMS NTL boundaries) for comparison. Figure 4.11 shows a graph which gives a visual comparison of destroyed vs. exposed.

4-Pile structures accounted for the majority of the destroyed platforms with tripods accounting for the next largest destroyed structure type. This is not a surprise as 4-Pile platforms make up the largest fleet of those platforms exposed as can be seen in Figure 4.10. There were 919 4-Pile platforms exposed to Gustav and Ike and 27 were destroyed which accounts for approximately 3% of that structure type.

Tripods make up the next group with 11 destroyed out of 237 exposed. This equates to approximately 5% of the Tripod fleet exposed destroyed, representing almost the highest percentage of structure type failures during Gustav and Ike. Note that 8-pile platforms actually had a higher percentage of destroyed (5.3%) but this was a much more limited dataset of 38 structures and the two destroyed were of early 1970s design with low deck elevations (under 45 ft).

The number of Tripods is surprisingly high and this should be investigated further. One consideration is that these types of structures have little redundancy in that if one of the braces or legs or piles is damaged, there are few alternative load paths. Deeper water versions of Tripods, in say more than 200 ft water depth, are dynamically sensitive and this may also be a concern in large storms in terms of dynamic amplification of loading.

Table 4.4 Destroyed and Exposed Platforms by Structure Type

Structure Type	Exposed	Destroyed	% Destroyed
Caisson	819	9	1.1%
Tripod	237	11	4.6%
4-Pile	919	27	2.9%
4-Pile (Skirt)	26	1	3.8%
6-Pile	90	2	2.2%
6-Pile (Skirt)	1	0	0.0%
8-Pile	304	8	2.6%
8-Pile (Skirt)	38	2	5.3%
10-Pile	12	0	0.0%
12-Pile	14	0	0.0%
Over 12-Pile	25	0	0.0%
TOTAL	**2485**	**60**	**2.4%**





Figure 4.10 Exposed and Destroyed Platforms by Structure Type



Figure 4.11 Exposed and Destroyed Platforms by Structure Type (Bar Graph)
The red number indicates number of destroyed.

5.0 PLATFORM COMPARISON TO DESIGN STANDARDS

This section compares the platform fleet exposed to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike to design standards. It uses API categorization and associated design and assessment criteria to make the comparison to observed performance.

Per RP2A, platforms designed after 2000 are classified per RP2A Section 2 and carry an "L" designation. The categories are L-1 high consequence, L-2 medium consequence or L-3 low consequence. Platforms designed before 2000 carry an "A" designation and are classified per RP2A Section 17. These categories are defined as A-1 for high consequence, A-2 for medium consequence and A-3 as low consequence. The formal definitions are contained in RP2A.

5.1 Destroyed Platforms by API Category

Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 shows destroyed and exposed platforms by API Category. As a general observation platform performance by API Category seems to compare well with previous platform performance by API category studies [Puskar, et.al. 2006, Puskar, et.al. 2007]. As shown in Table 5.1 A-2 platforms suffered the most destruction with a total of 37 platforms destroyed. The next API categories with the highest number of platforms destroyed were in the A-1 and L-2 platform fleet, followed by A-3 platforms and for the first time an L-1 platform was destroyed.

Table 5.1 Exposed and Destroyed Platforms by API Category

API Category	Exposed	Destroyed	% Destroyed
A-1	190	7	3.7%
A-2	1015	37	3.6%
A-3	856	6	0.7%
L-1	65	1	1.5%
L-2	252	7	2.8%
L-3	186	0	0.0%
Unknown	681	2	-
TOTAL	**3245**	**60**	**1.8%**





Figure 5.1 Exposed and Destroyed Platforms by API Category
Platforms with an unknown API Category not shown

Over the past few years, the MMS requested platform owners to classify their platforms according to Assessment Category and submit the resulting designation and this was included in the data. Previous Figure 4.7 showed the number of destroyed platforms by API category as stacked columns per decade the platform was installed. The category data was not available for some of the platforms, in which case the platform category was designated as unknown.

Review of the categorized destroyed platforms indicates that a majority of the destroyed platforms were classified as A-2 and predominately of 1970s vintage. Table 5.1 shows there were more A-2 platforms exposed by comparison than other categories in the GOM (approximately 40% of the exposed platforms with a known API category). Ike destroyed almost 4% of the A-2 platforms exposed.

As shown in Figure 5.2, approximately 190 A-1's were exposed to hurricane winds and waves. There were only 7 A-1 platforms destroyed. This is in part due to the higher Section 17 strength and deck elevation requirements for a platform to be designated as A-1. A wave crest hitting a platform deck (wave-in-deck) creates a very large load that will likely result in significant platform damage and in many cases collapse. Hence a key ingredient in surviving hurricanes is to have a deck elevation above the largest hurricane waves. Wave load on decks is discussed in more detail in Section 6. Ike accounted for destroying approximately 4% of the A-1 platforms.

At the time of Gustav and Ike there were approximately 65 L-1's in the GOM exposed to hurricane loads. The 20th edition was issued in 1993 and included a major change to the RP2A wave load recipe, resulting in a significant increase in the design metocean loading for L-1 conditions. The industry began to implement this approach on new L-1 platforms in the mid to late 1990's with most L-1 platforms designed to the 20th edition by about 2000. There was, however, one L-1 platform that was destroyed by Ike. This is the first time an L-1 platform has been destroyed. This platform was a tripod in over 472 ft of water. The fact that only one L-1 platforms was destroyed in all the recent hurricanes is an indicator of the improved performance of these latest generation RP2A L-1 platforms.

There were several other post 2000 platforms that were destroyed, as shown by the 7 L-2 failures in Figure 4.7. The 21st edition of RP 2A was issued in the year 2000 and provided an option for "Consequence Based Design" (CBD) [Ward, et.al, 2000] whereby platforms are categorized according to their consequence of failure, and platforms with lower risk can use lower criteria than the 100 year design conditions. In the GOM, the L-1 and L-2 platforms can be manned-evacuated (or unmanned), while the L-3 platforms are always unmanned. The L-1 platforms have a high consequence of failure in terms of environmental conditions, while the L-2 platforms have a medium consequence of failure and the L-3 platforms have a low consequence of failure. L-3 platforms are essentially caisson structures (See RP2A Section 2 for the complete definition of these platforms). The associated design return periods are 100 year for L-1, 50 year for L-2 and 15 year for L-3, based upon Ward, et.al. 2000.

Figure 4.7 shows that almost all of the platforms destroyed that were installed post-2000 were L-2 platforms (designed to 50 year criteria). Hence, most of the post-2000 installation platforms were not designed to the 100 year conditions so failure is not unexpected in an extreme storm like Ike or Gustav. Per Figure 5.2, the number of L-2's exposed during Gustav and Ike was approximately 252 and the number of L-3 platforms exposed was approximately 186.

As the name "consequence based design" implies, the L-2 and L-3 platforms are more susceptible to the consequences of damage and destruction in hurricanes. Platform owners need to be aware of the fact that design to L-2 or L-3 conditions may result in the failure or damage of even the newest platforms. However, it should be noted a key observation was that there were no L-3 platforms destroyed in the hurricanes. As previously discussed, L-3 platforms are mainly caisson type structures and are limited to water depths of 100 ft or less. As a result of this water depth limitation, these structures tend to be closer to land where waves tend to break due to their interaction with the seafloor, and therefore the waves are generally the same maximum size, even for the largest hurricanes.



Figure 5.2 Exposed and Destroyed Platforms by API Category

Note: There were no L-3 category structures destroyed.

5.2 Hindcast Data Comparisons

Sections 5.2.1 through 5.2.3 compares Hindcast wave and crest data to the entire Gulf of Mexico platform fleet. For these sections, the objective was not only to look at platforms within the NTL boundaries but also those outside the boundaries as these boundaries were set based on the wind fields of the hurricanes and not wave heights. Due to the long duration and large fetch of the hurricanes, especially Ike, a larger set of platforms, including those outside the MMS NTL boundaries, was used for the data in this section. Furthermore, the MMS inquired whether the NTL boundary was set appropriately in order to check if the size of the inspection zone should be increased.

5.2.1 Hindcast Wave Comparison to API Category

In order to determine how platforms performed during the hurricanes, the platforms were binned in their respective API category and were compared to the appropriate recommended practice design/assessment criteria. In this section, a platform's performance is gauged by comparing platform Hindcast maximum wave (H_{max}) data [Oceanweather, 2008] vs. the API recommended maximum wave height defined for its API category.

It should be noted, for this data set, a platform must have Hindcast data available and a calculable API recommended wave height (a function of API category and water depth). In some cases the water depth is too shallow or the platform is in a special location and there is no Hindcast or API design wave height information available. Consequently, only those platforms that have Hindcast data and calculable wave heights are presented here. Plots for these comparisons are provided at the end of the section and are examined below.

Figure 5.4 shows 46 of the L-1's that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 20 saw conditions less than the API recommended design wave height while 26 saw conditions greater than their design wave; 1 of which was destroyed. As previously mentioned, this is the first time that an L-1 platform was destroyed in a hurricane (it was a tripod). Overall, the L-1 fleet performed well considering Figure 5.4 shows over 50% of these platforms saw waves greater than the API recommended design wave and survived. Perhaps some of these might have been damaged, but at the time of this report this could not be verified. As so many platforms saw waves exceeding the L-1 criteria (100 year return period), it is recommended API look at additional design guidance to ensure that platforms have sufficient robustness to survive conditions greater than L-1.

Figure 5.5 shows 157 of the A-1 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 123 saw waves less than the API recommended wave height; 5 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there were 34 platforms which experienced waves greater than the API recommended wave; 2 of which were destroyed. It is not expected, but it is possible that the 5 destroyed which saw waves less than the API recommended design wave were not A-1's, as determined by analysis, but rather only set by deck height. However, further study would be needed to confirm this.

Figure 5.6 shows 257 of the L-2 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 67 saw waves less than the API recommended design wave height and there were 190 platforms which saw waves greater than the API recommended design wave; 7 of which were destroyed. It should be noted that the destroyed platforms all saw waves in excess of the recommended wave and, therefore, these failures should be expected. Also note that, while the L-2's are designed to lower criteria than an L-1 platform, the API required deck height is the same. Therefore, if the storm wave height does not exceed the deck height (no wave-in-deck), less destroyed platforms are expected. This is explored further in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.

Figure 5.7 shows 924 of the A-2 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 188 saw waves less than the API recommended design wave height and there were 736 platforms which saw waves greater than the API recommended design wave; 35 of which were destroyed. Of the 736 that saw a wave greater than the API recommended design wave, 517 (approximately 70%) saw a wave more than 5 ft over the API recommended design wave; 175 (approximately 24%) saw a wave more than 10 ft over the API recommended design wave; 12 (approximately 2%) saw a wave more than 15 ft over the API recommended design wave; and 1 platform saw a wave more than 20 ft over the API recommended wave. This is a particularly good finding as the data shows that most A-2 platforms saw Hindcast waves larger that the API recommended wave height and most saw waves in the range of 5-10 ft over the recommended wave height. Over 80% of the known A-2 fleet was therefore "proof loaded" above the API A-2 recommended wave. Note that of the 736 exposed A-2 platforms that saw a wave greater than the API recommended wave, approximately 40% are manned/evacuated. A-2 platforms are required by API to be able to survive a "sudden" hurricane that forms in such a manner that evacuation is not possible. The fact that so many A-2 platforms saw waves in excess of API recommendation and survived is good news.

Figure 5.8 shows 125 of the L-3 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 11 saw waves less than the API recommended design wave height and there were 114 platforms which saw waves greater than the API recommended design wave. However, there were no destroyed L-3 platforms. This may be partly explained by the fact that a large percentage of L-3 platforms are designed for wave inundation as they are boat access only. However, given the fact that most L-3 platforms experienced waves greater than the API recommended wave it is surprising that there were not any destroyed L-3 platforms. Therefore, damage is expected to the L-3 platform fleet but there was no data to support this at the time of this report.

Figure 5.9 shows 358 of the A-3 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 47 saw waves less than the API recommended design wave height and there were 311 platforms which saw waves greater than the API recommended design wave; 4 of which were destroyed. Even though the A-3 fleet performed well (with relatively few losses), the high number of platforms which saw greater than the API recommended design wave suggests that overall damage to A-3 platforms could be widespread. Perhaps this is the case, but at the time of this report that could not be confirmed.

Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3 summarize by API category the count of platforms where the Hindcast wave was greater than the API recommended wave.

Table 5.2 Summary of Hindcast Waves vs. API Recommended Waves

Comparison	L-1	A-1	L-2	A-2	L-3	A-3	TOTAL
Hindcast Wave ≥ API Recommended Design Wave	26	34	190	736	114	311	1411
Hindcast Wave < API Recommended Design Wave	20	123	67	188	11	47	456

Overall, considering the number of platforms that saw waves higher than the API recommended wave (1411 of 1867; approximately 75%), it is surprising that there were only 60 destroyed platforms. However, it suggests that a large number of platforms might be damaged. This may be the case but at the time of this report that statistic could not be confirmed. Furthermore, it seems the NTL Inspection boundary captured the majority of platforms that saw the larger waves.



Figure 5.3 Hindcast Wave vs. API Recommended Wave for Exposed and Destroyed Platforms



Figure 5.4 Hindcast H_{max} vs. API Recommended Design Wave for L-1 Platform

Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and recommended wave



Figure 5.5 Hindcast H_{max} vs. API Recommended Wave for A-1 Platform
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and recommended wave



Figure 5.6 Hindcast H_{max} vs. API Recommended Design Wave for L-2 Platform

Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and recommended wave



Figure 5.7 Hindcast H_{max} vs. API Recommended Wave for A-2 Platforms

Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and recommended wave



Figure 5.8 Hindcast H_{max} vs. API Recommended Design Wave for L-3 Platform

Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and recommended wave



Figure 5.9 Hindcast H_{max} vs. API Recommended Wave for A-3 Platform

Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and recommended wave

5.2.2 Hindcast Crest Comparison to Deck Height

In this section, a platform's performance is gauged by comparing the Hindcast maximum crest elevation [Oceanweather, 2008] vs. the actual (reported) deck height. If a platform saw a Hindcast wave crest elevation below its actual deck height, it is expected that the platform saw no wave-in-deck. If the crest exceeds the platforms actual deck height, it is expected that the platform saw wave-in-deck and likely incurred some damage. Plots for these comparisons are provided at the end of the section and are examined below.

It should be noted, for this data set, a platform must have Hindcast crest elevation data available and a deck height reported to the MMS. Consequently, only those that have hindcast data and reported deck heights are presented here. Plots for these comparisons are provided at the end of the section and are examined below.

Figure 5.11 shows 16 of the L-1's that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 9 saw a Hindcast wave crest with no wave-in-deck while 7 saw wave-in-deck; 1 of which was destroyed (approximately 14%). Note that approximately 44% of the 16 platforms exposed did see wave-in-deck. However, due to the low number of L-1 platforms destroyed (1) compared with the 65 L-1 platforms exposed, it is clear that wave-in-deck was, in general, not an issue for L-1 platforms. Perhaps this suggests that some of the L-1 platforms (16) may have deck heights higher than their reported deck heights. Careful examination of L-1 damage statistics not available at the time of this report would be required to confirm whether a platform saw wave-in-deck (see Section 5.2.3 for further discussion).

Figure 5.12 shows 187 of the A-1 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 163 saw no wave-in-deck; 2 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there were 24 platforms which saw wave-in-deck; 4 of which were destroyed (approximately 17%). Note approximately 87% of the 187 A-1 platforms exposed saw no wave-in-deck based on their reported deck heights. This, also taking into account that Section 5.2.1 revealed that approximately 78% of A-1 platforms did not see a Hindcast wave greater than the API recommended wave, suggests that overall A-1 platform damage may not be widespread.

Figure 5.13 shows 112 of the L-2 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 91 saw no wave-in-deck; 3 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there were 21 platforms which saw wave-in-deck. It is expected that most L-2 platforms would not have seen wave-in-deck since the API minimum required deck height for an L-2 platform is the same as L-1 platform. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the destroyed L-2 platforms saw no wave-in-deck. This suggests factors other than wave-in-deck are involved in the destroyed L-2 platforms (see Section 5.2.1).

Figure 5.14 shows 931 of the A-2 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 849 saw no wave-in-deck; 17 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there were 82 platforms which saw wave-in-deck; 18 of which were destroyed. While approximately 90% of the 931 A-2 platforms did not see wave-in-deck, approximately 10% did. Of the 82 platforms which saw wave-in-deck, 18 were destroyed (approximately 22%). Therefore, as was expected, the data suggests that if a platform experiences wave-in-deck, it stands a good chance of incurring damage in a major storm.

Figure 5.15 shows 74 of the L-3 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 47 saw no wave-in-deck and 27 platforms did see wave-in-deck. Note again, however, that there were no destroyed L-3 platforms. As stated previously, this may be partly explained by the fact that most L-3 platforms are designed for wave inundation. However, approximately 36% of L-3 platforms did see wave-in-deck on their reported deck heights, therefore additional damaged L-3 platforms are expected.

Figure 5.16 shows 368 of the A-3 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 278 saw no wave-in-deck; 4 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there were 90 platforms which saw wave-in-deck. The data suggests that wave-in-deck did not play a major role in the destruction of the A-3 platforms. Also consider that Section 5.2.1 showed that approximately 87% of A-3 platforms exposed saw a wave height greater than or equal to the A-3 recommended wave. Taken together, the Hindcast wave and crest elevation comparisons suggest that while there wasn't a large number of A-3 platforms destroyed, there is likely a large number which incurred damage.

Table 5.3 and Figure 5.10 summarize the destroyed and exposed platforms where a Hindcast wave was greater than the actual platform deck height.

Table 5.3 Summary of Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. Actual Deck Height

Comparison	L-1	A-1	L-2	A-2	L-3	A-3	TOTAL
Hindcast Crest Elevation ≥ Actual Deck Height	7	24	21	82	27	90	252
Hindcast Crest Elevation < Actual Deck Height	9	163	91	849	47	278	1437

Overall, approximately 15% (252) of the exposed platforms saw wave-in-deck loading. Of that 252, 25 platforms that were destroyed saw wave-in-deck loading. Therefore, approximately 10% of platforms which saw wave-in-deck were destroyed. This suggests a larger percentage of platforms which saw wave-in-deck were damaged. This is further evidence which suggest that if a platform sees wave-in-deck loading, there is a good chance of destruction or substantial damage occurring. Furthermore the Inspection boundaries seemed to bound those that were expected to see wave in deck.





Figure 5.10 Hindcast Crest Elevation Exceeds Actual (Reported) Deck Height for Exposed and Destroyed Platforms



Figure 5.11 Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. Actual (Reported) Deck Height for L-1 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and a reported deck height



Figure 5.12 Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. Actual (Reported) Deck Height for A-1 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and a reported deck height



Figure 5.13 Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. Actual (Reported) Deck Height for L-2 Platforms

Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and a reported deck height



Figure 5.14 Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. Actual (Reported) Deck Height for A-2 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and a reported deck height



Figure 5.15 Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. Actual (Reported) Deck Height for L-3 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and a reported deck height



Figure 5.16 Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. Actual (Reported) Deck Height for A-3 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a calculable hindcast and a reported deck height

5.2.3 Hindcast Crest Comparison to API Minimum Elevation of Underside of Deck

In this section, a comparison of Hindcast maximum crest elevation [Oceanweather, 2008] vs. the API minimum elevation of underside of deck (API recommended deck height) and not the actual reported deck height. If the platforms had their decks set to minimum API requirements and the Hindcast wave crest elevation is below the API recommended deck height for a platform, it is expected that the platform saw no wave-in-deck. If the crest exceeds the API recommended deck height it is expected that the platform would have seen wave-in-deck if the deck was set at the API recommended elevation. Note that a comparison for L-3 platforms is not included since this type comparison cannot be made without further information on each platform since there is not an individual API recommended deck height for L-3. Plots for these comparisons are provided at the end of the section and are examined below.

It should be noted, for this data set, a platform must have Hindcast crest elevation data available and a calculable API recommended deck height (a function of API category and water depth). Consequently, only those that have hindcast data and calculable deck heights are presented here. Plots for these comparisons are provided at the end of the section and are examined below.

Figure 5.18 shows 47 of the L-1's that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 42 saw a Hindcast wave crest with no expected wave-in-deck while 5 would be expected to see wave-in-deck; 1 of which was destroyed. The data shows that most L-1 platforms were not expected to see wave-in-deck. However, the 5 L-1 platforms that were expected to have seen wave-in-deck are located primarily on the shelf edge. Prior studies on hurricane Ivan and Rita/Katrina also noted this observation [Energo, 2005 and 2007]. This suggests that further investigation into the effects of the platform location to this boundary may be warranted. This is also the location of the largest Ike waves and perhaps there are more breaking waves or other influence from the sudden decrease in water depth in this region as waves transition from deep water at the shelf edge.

Figure 5.19 shows 157 of the A-1 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 122 saw no wave-in-deck; 3 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there were 35 platforms which would be expected to see wave-in-deck; 4 of which were destroyed. Again, note the proximity of the platforms which were expected to see wave-in-deck to the shelf boundary. Overall, approximately 78% of the 157 A-1 platforms were expected to see no wave-in-deck. Again the location of these platforms to the shelf edge suggests that further investigation into the effects from the sudden decrease in water depth in this region is warranted.

Figure 5.20 shows 258 of the L-2 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 252 saw no wave-in-deck; 4 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there are 6 platforms which would be expected to see wave-in-deck. Again, it is expected that most L-2 platforms would not have seen wave-in-deck since the API minimum required deck height for an L-2 platform is the same as L-1 platform. However, consider that Section 5.2.1 reveals that approximately 74% of L-2 platforms saw waves larger than their API recommended design wave.

Figure 5.21 shows 943 of the A-2 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 499 saw no wave-in-deck; 3 of which were destroyed. Additionally, there were 444 platforms which would be expected to see wave-in-deck; 32 of which were destroyed. Since the data shows that approximately 90% A-2 platforms which were destroyed were expected to see wave-in-deck, the data suggests that wave-in-deck likely played a larger role in the destroyed A-2 platforms than Section 5.2.2 (comparison to actual deck height) suggested.

Figure 5.22 shows 371 of the A-3 platforms that were exposed to Ike and Gustav. Of these, 135 saw no wave-in-deck; 1 of which was destroyed. Additionally, there were 236 platforms which would be expected to see wave-in-deck; 3 of which were destroyed. Since the data shows that approximately 64% of A-3 platforms were expected to see wave-in-deck it's suggested that most A-3 platforms do not have adequate deck heights. Section 5.2.2 suggested that approximately 25% of A-3 platforms saw wave-in-deck when looking at the reported deck heights. Therefore, damage statistics not available at the time of this report would likely show a high percentage of A-3 platforms damaged. The data suggests that wave-in-deck did not play a major role in the destruction of the A-3 platforms. Also consider that Section 5.2.1 showed that approximately 87% of A-3 platforms exposed saw a wave height greater than or equal to the A-3 recommended design wave. Taken together, the Hindcast wave and crest elevation comparisons suggest that while there wasn't a large number of A-3 platforms destroyed, there may have been a large number which incurred damage.

Figure 5.17 and Table 5.4 summarizes the destroyed and exposed platforms where a Hindcast wave was greater than the API recommended deck height.

Table 5.4 Summary of Hindcast Crest Elevation vs. API Recommended Deck Height

Comparison	L-1	A-1	L-2	A-2	A-3	TOTAL
Hindcast Crest Elevation ≥ API Recommended Deck Height	5	35	6	444	236	726
Hindcast Crest Elevation < API Recommended Deck Height	42	122	252	499	135	1050

Overall, the data shows that approximately 40% (726) of the platforms exposed were expected to see wave-in-deck loading if their decks were set at the current API minimum deck elevation. This is not supported by Section 5.2.2 which stated that approximately 15% of platforms exposed saw wave-in-deck loading. Even removing L-3 platforms from the Section 5.2.2 data set (since they're not included in this sections data set), Section 5.2.2 suggest approximately 17% of exposed platforms saw wave-in-deck. This suggest that some of the decks might have been set higher than the minimum required and thus the reason there was not as much damage as expected. Platform owners often set decks at higher heights.





Figure 5.17 Crest Elevation Exceeds API Recommended Deck Height for Exposed and Destroyed Platforms



Figure 5.18 Hindcast Crest Elevation Vs API Recommended Deck Height for L-1 Platforms

Note: Shown are only those platforms with a Calculable Hindcast and API Deck Height



Figure 5.19 Hindcast Crest Elevation Vs API Recommended Deck Height for A-1 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a Calculable Hindcast and API Deck Height



Figure 5.20 Hindcast Crest Elevation Vs API Recommended Deck Height for L-2 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a Calculable Hindcast and API Deck Height



Figure 5.21 Hindcast Crest Elevation Vs API Recommended Deck Height for A-2 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a Calculable Hindcast and API Deck Height



Figure 5.22 Hindcast Crest Elevation Vs API Recommended Deck Height for A-3 Platforms
Note: Shown are only those platforms with a Calculable Hindcast and API Deck Height

5.3 Jacket Structure Pancake Leg

5.3.1 Background

First observed in Hurricane Lili and tentatively called "pancake leg", this damage has been observed in every major storm since Lili, including Ike. There are 21 platforms known to have this damage. In some cases a platform has more than one bulge or pancake separation (sever) of the leg. While the total presented here is from those found to be damaged it is suspected some of the destroyed platforms perhaps failed as a result of this type of damage. Figure 5.23 shows a photo of this type of damage.



Figure 5.23 Vermillion Area Pancake Leg Damage (VR 1)

As first suggested in the Katrina and Rita study [Energo, 2007] the damage seems to develop as a result of the significant stiffness change between nominal section of the jacket leg and the joint can section.

Figure 5.24 shows the initiating local buckle for this type of damage that occurs in the thin wall leg section just above the thicker joint can. This is caused by excessive loads in the nominal leg section due to the hurricane loading. Note that a thicker leg wall section here (perhaps by as little as ¼ inch) or a grouted leg-pile annulus would have prevented this initial buckle from ever occurring. Figure 5.25 illustrates the next phase of the damage, usually found in the proximity of a longitudinal weld seam, although typically not at the weld. As the jacket leg begins to acquire more loading, the leg will usually separate within the heat affected zone between the two differing wall thicknesses. After the jacket leg separates the pancaking of the leg occurs as was previously shown in Figure 5.23 and also shown in Figure 5.26. Back and forth motion of the platform due to waves, coupled with the fact that the jacket leg is no longer connected and platform movement is significantly increased, allows the platform to hammer the separated sections into each other resulting in the flattened pancake region [Energo, 2007]. At this point the platform is in a precarious position as longer duration or small increase in wave height would most likely result in platform collapse.



Figure 5.24 Pancake Leg Damage – Initial Damage Configuration (EI 2)



Figure 5.25 Pancake Leg Damage – Leg Separation Configuration (ST 1)

Figure 5.26 Pancake Leg Damage – Final Damage Configuration (VR 1)

Table 5.5 contains a sanitized list of the structures that have had this type of damage. The list contains parameters like install date, damage type, damage depth and the hurricane that caused it. It also contains the D/t ratio in the damaged area and the joint can in the vicinity of the damage.

The platforms that experienced this type of damage were older 60's and 70's vintage platforms with several from both the 80's and 90's. While it would not seem that there would be this type of damage in the more modern platforms, it's not a surprise as platform design was advancing and becoming more efficient to reduce total weight, which can be reduced substantially by decreasing the wall thickness of the legs between joint cans. It seems however, to be a detriment to the robustness of the platform.

Another observation is that the damage is not a consequence of a specific type of hurricane (e.g., long duration Ike) since it has occurred in every major hurricane since Lili. While storm duration is a key element, it seems to be more a factor of overall platform performance once the damage has occurred (i.e., will it fail or not).

The majority of platforms that experienced this type of damage were "through the leg" 4 or 8 pile platforms, with only a few platforms that have skirt piles. To date this type of damage has not been found platforms where there is no "through the leg" pile (i.e. skirt piled only). It is not clear if this type of damage would occur on a platform that did not have piles through the leg.

The majority of platforms that experienced this damage mechanism where in water depths greater than 100 feet with most greater than 200 feet. Only one shallower water platform (ST 1) experienced this type of damage. The damage still seems to be located in the upper two bays of the platform or in the bottom bay.

In some platforms, the legs had external ring stiffeners, yet the buckle still occurred. Buckles were observed both close to the ring stiffeners as well as far away. The ring stiffeners seem to have no effect on the buckles in term of prevention. It is not clear from the original documentation for these platforms if the ring stiffeners were intended to prevent this type of buckling, or if they were intended for other issues such as to prevent hydrostatic collapse during installation.

Table 5.5 Platforms With Pancake Leg Damage

Count	Sanized Name	Damage Type	Install Date	Platform Type	Leg Dimensions (at damage)		Leg Joint Can Dimensions		Leg D/t (at Damage)	Leg D/t (at Joint Can)	Elevation of Damage (ft)	Water Depth (ft)	Hurricane	Hmax during Hurricane (ft)
					Diameter (in)	Thickness (in)	Diameter (in)	Thickness (in)						
1	EC 1	Pancake	1988	4-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	67	307	Ike	72.2
2	EI 1	Pancake	1963	8-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	139	140	Rita	61.6
3	EI 2	Bulge	1973	4-P	51.5	0.75	53	1.5	69	35	50	153	Ike	62.7
4	EI 3	Pancake	1976	4-P	39	0.5	39	1.25	78	31	18	153	Ike	N/A
5	EI 4	Pancake	1971	4-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	22	172	Lili	N/A
6	EI 5	Bulge	1973	4-P/4-SK	53	0.625	54	1.625	85	33	88	244	Rita	71.8
7	EI 6	Pancake	1990	?	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	260	Lili	N/A
8	EI 7	Pancake	1971	8-P	51.25	0.625	53.5	1.75	82	31	65	248	Rita	72.6
9	EI 8	Bulge	1972	8-P	39	0.5	40	1	78	40	76 & 126	246	Ike	72.8
10	EI 9	Pancake	1984	?	33	0.75	33	0.75	44	44	*	414	Ike	78.8
11	MC 1	Pancake	1978	8-P/4-SK	*	*	*	*	*	*	35	425	Katrina	71.2
12	MP 1	Pancake	1997	4-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	6& 58	307	Ivan	76.9
13	MP 2	Bulge	1977	4-P/4-SK	*	*	*	*	*	*	86	293	Ivan	74.4
14	SP 1	Bulge	1967	8-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	N/A	340	Ivan	72.4
15	SP 2	Bulge	1968	8-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	N/A	322	Ivan	72.6
16	SP 3	Bulge	1968	8-P/8-SK	*	*	*	*	*	*	277	328	Ivan	72.3
17	SS 1	Pancake & Bulge	1969	4-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	22 & 28	157	Ike	63.2
18	ST 1	Pancake	1985	4-P	*	*	*	*	*	*	38	56	Rita	42
19	VR 1	Pancake	1984	4-P	51.25	0.625	52.5	1.25	82	42	46	212	Ike	71.9
20	VR 2	Pancake	1996	4-P	51.25	0.625	53.5	1.75	82	31	84	300	Rita	75.5
21	WD 1	Pancake	1970	8-P/8-SK	51.75	0.625	52.25	1.125	82.8	46	320	370	Katrina	75.2

Note:
*- data was not available at the time of this report

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5.3.2 Comparison to API Member Design Approach

For this section, a more in-depth study was conducted to determine if engineering practice is able to predict this type of damage. Section 3.2 in API RP2A 21st Edition contains equations that check for column buckling which is based in part on D/t ratios [API, 2005]. For members with D/t ratios equal to or less than 60, Equations 3.2.2-1 and 3.2.2-2 apply. These are the normal AISC formulas for members subjected to axial compression and their failure is governed by either Euler buckling or overall material yield. For members with D/t ratios greater than 60, failures are driven by local buckling. RP2A provides formulas for calculating the critical local buckling stress; however, the formulas are empirical and based on results of laboratory buckling tests [API, 2005]. Equations 3.2.2-3 and 3.2.2-4 calculate the elastic and inelastic critical local buckling stress due to axial compression loads. This smaller of the elastic or inelastic critical buckling stress is then used to replace the material yield strength in Equations 3.2.2-1 or 3.2.2-2.

Of the 21 platforms in Table 5.5 that experienced this type of damage drawings were available for nine. Eight of these had D/t greater than 60 in the region of the damage with only one having a D/t in the range where normal AISC buckling formulas apply. Hence, based on the platforms where data is available, the data indicate that the local buckling formulas apply. As can be seen it Figure 5.24, the pancake leg is initiated by a local buckle in the leg.

In order to verify that the damage is predictable, the hindcast criteria for the storm which caused the damage was used in combination with the API formulas. SACS structural models were available for two of the platforms namely VR 1 and VR 2. A design level analysis was run to determine if this type of damage is predictable analytically and in the location where it was found. Wind, wave, current, surge/tide, direction, etc was used in the analysis in order to get a representation of the loads the leg experienced.

For both VR 1 and VR 2 axial stresses above allowable was predictable. Figure 5.27 is a screen shot of the Member Review and Redesign feature in SACS. This feature allows the user to view member properties along with the actual and allowable stresses along with the Unity Checks (UC) Ratios for any member selected. As seen in Figure 5.28 in both platforms the actual axial stress is higher than the allowable stress. For VR 1 the actual stress was 30.3 ksi and the allowable stress was 18.5 ksi, resulting in stresses considerably above allowable. For VR 2 the actual stress was 46.0 ksi and the allowable stress was 18.5 ksi, again resulting in stresses above allowable. A hand calculation confirmed the allowable axial stress was calculated taking into account the critical buckling stress as found in RP2A.



Figure 5.27 Member Review

5.3.3 Comparison to Analysis

As another check a global finite element analysis was performed in the form of an ultimate strength analysis on both VR 1 and VR 2 to determine if the damage was predictable. Again, hindcast conditions were used to develop the loading and SACS COLLAPSE was used to perform the analysis. The analysis for both platforms was able to predict the damage. SACS COLLAPSE predicts high plasticity in the model in the general location of the observed leg pancake.



Figure 5.28 SACS COLLAPSE Plot of VR 1 & 2

Finally, a more local finite element analysis (FEA) with shell elements was generated to determine if the damage was predictable. The FEA was performed using ABAQUS. Thin shell elements were used to develop the FEA model. Since it is a member ultimate capacity estimate, the FEA considered large deformation, nonlinear geometry, material plasticity, and buckling. Forces and moments where obtained from the SACS model and applied to the FEA model.

The undamaged leg was analyzed using boundary conditions representing the in-place structure. Figures 5.29 show the deformed shape and Von Mises stress contour of the undamaged as-design leg and at the last load step before it fails. Results indicate the leg will fail in buckling, with the first few local buckles initiating the global failure. Note that for this platform there are ring stiffeners on the leg in the vicinity of the buckles (both the analytical and actual observed). The ring stiffeners did not prevent the local buckles from occurring.



Figure 5.29 VR 2 FEA

To summarize, both the member design approach and the finite element theory approach were able to predict the damage. SACS and FEA predicted stresses above allowable in both cases. It does not always predict damage in the exact location along the length of the member where the damage occurred. But it does identify the correct bay where the damage occurred. One explanation might be that the inelastic formulas are based on theoretical and experimental data. These formula's accounts for initial imperfections; however, the location of these imperfections and residual stresses vary from platform to platform and even on a smaller scale from can section to can section within the nominal leg section.

Another observation is the hindcast wave heights in every damage case found in Table 5.5 are very close to API's 100 year design criteria (i.e. L-1). While these damages seem to be predictable using API formulas, storm loading sensitivity studies are recommended to know whether or not a small increase in storm loading will cause this damage. For high consequence platforms it is suggested a limiting value for D/t be introduced as a robustness check. A check using a higher return period should also illuminate the problem.

Another area of concern is the transition from joint can to nominal leg section. As can be seen in Table 2 the transitions from joint can to nominal can be significant. For the 9 platforms where the data was available the average change in thickness is 0.625”. This change in thickness causes an eccentricity in the load path, inducing a small local moment. This moment is also suspected in causing the initial buckle that may result in the pancaking effect. Figure 5.30 is a schematic and a picture of VR 1 platform which shows this transition.



Figure 5.30 VR 1 Picture

As noted above, the “pancake” problem can be eliminated in new platform designs by implementing a maximum D/t limit on critical large diameter platform members such as the jacket legs or deck legs. A value on order of 50-60 may be sufficient, but this needs to be determined based upon further work. Existing platforms with this problem can be identified based upon high D/t in the nominal section of the leg (between joint cans). It appears that thick joint cans with thin walled leg sections increase the likelihood of this problem due to the local moment at the transition from thin to thick wall thickness. If an existing platform is identified with this problem, it can be cost effectively mitigated by grouting the pile-leg annulus. It is recommended that this phenomenon be investigated further and the appropriate design guidance be developed for new platforms and that guidance be developed to identify this problem on existing platforms.

6.0 PLATFORM DAMAGE OBSERVATIONS

6.1 General Types of Observed Damage

Studies of post storm damage and destruction to platforms always yield spectacular above and below water photos of damage [Energo, 2007]. Gustav and Ike were no exception. In general, the damage has been the same as reported in the prior hurricanes, with bent deck beams, buckled braces, cracked joints, cracked legs, etc., all of which have been primarily due to strength overload.

The general types of platform damage both to main structure and secondary structure are as follows.

- Braces. Buckles, dents, holes, cracks, tears, out-of-plane bowing, severed members.
- Legs. Buckles, dents, holes, cracks, tears, pancake leg sever (see Section 5.2.3), broken crown shim at top-of-jacket.
- Joints. Cracks at weld, cracks into chord, cracks into brace, punch-through of brace, pull out of brace (including a piece (coupon) of the leg material, leaving a hole in the leg), buckled nodes.
- Conductor trays. Cracks at joints (typically at 6 and 12 o'clock), conductor torn loose from guide, tray drops and jams between conductors.
- Deck. Bent wide flange beams, bent deck legs, bent stairways and landings.
- Miscellaneous. Usually at first elevation above waterline (+10 ft to +15 ft). Broken or missing walkways, boat landings, riser guards, boat bumpers and damage to other non-structural items.

6.1.1 Observed Floating Platform Damage

Figure 6.1 shows the floating platform fleet exposed to hurricanes Gustav and Ike. There were 35 floating platforms in the GOM at the time of Gustav and Ike of which 19 sustained minor to moderate topsides damage. Damage mainly consisted of minor non-structural damage. Items like cable trays, handrails, lighting fixtures, tubing took most of the brunt with several reports of umbilical termination assemblies having varying forms of damage. One floater had major damage in that it lost its drilling rig package. API developed RP 2TD (tie downs) to provide guidance in order to prevent such failures following hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Damage examples can be seen in Figures 6.2 - 6.4.



Figure 6.1 Gulf of Mexico Floating Platform Fleet
White dots indicate floating platform location with no damage reported
Yellow dots indicate floating platform location with damage reported

Figure 6.2 Handrail and Cable Damage from Green Water

Figure 6.3 Missing Grating around Risers in Moon Pool

Figure 6.4 Cable Tray Damage Top of hull

6.1.2 Observed Fixed Platform Damage

Figure 6.5 shows the fixed platform fleet exposed to Gustav and Ike. According to the MMS [MMS 2008] 31 fixed platforms sustained extensive damage and another 93 sustained moderate damage. Further review determined the damage to be mainly to the platforms topsides structural and process equipment. While there is little doubt there is extensive damage below, the data was not available at the time of this report to run statistics.



Figure 6.5 Gulf of Mexico Fixed Platform Fleet
White dots indicate fixed platform location with no damage reported
Yellow dots indicate fixed platform location with moderate damage reported
Orange dots indicate fixed platform location with extensive damage reported

Figure 6.6 Out of Plane Bowing of Vertical Diagonal Brace
(Note missing marine growth indicating high stress region)

Figure 6.7 Damaged K-brace Node
(Note missing marine growth indicating high stress region)

Figure 6.8 Crushed X-brace node
(Note missing marine growth indicating high stress region)



Figure 6.9 Missing Member with Coupon Torn from Chord

One finding that has not been seen on such a large scale is the number of leaning jacket type structures. While past storms have resulted in numerous single free-standing caissons leaning, Gustav and Ike resulted in at least 7 jacket type structures. Four (4) were tripods and two (2) were 4-pile platforms (1 - through leg piled and 1 - skirt piled) and one (1) 8-pile. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 are pictures of two tripods found leaning after Ike.

As shown in Section 4 there has been over 300 platforms that have been destroyed since 1948. However, the reported damage in almost every case was jacket failure with only a handful where the foundation was suspected to contribute to the failure [UT, 2010].



Figure 6.10 Leaning Platform in the East Cameron Area

Figure 6.11 Leaning Tripod Platform in the Eugene Island Area

While crown shims have not been an area prone to failure in the past Gustav and Ike has introduced at least 3 jacket type structures where crown shims failed (i.e. cracked, sheared, etc). Two of these failures where a result of overload of shims and weld with one case attributed to incomplete weld. Figure 6.12 shows an example of an incomplete weld.

It is suggested all pile-jacket shim connections be complete 360 degree welded connection. The crown shims should be designed as smooth curved shims to reduce stress-concentrations which affect fatigue life. It is also suggested the connection be designed to transfer the ultimate capacity of the pile not just the design load as this is the primary load transfer point between the jacket and the pile.

Figure 6.12 Crown Shim Failure due to Inadequate Welding

6.2 Example Mitigation Options

There are numerous repair techniques that can be safely deployed to address underwater structural damage and this section will present example mitigation options for some of the more typical underwater damage found on offshore platforms post hurricanes. While these techniques have been performed on numerous platforms they are not necessarily the only mitigation option for a particular damage.

Below is a list of typical repair options listed in order of least complex to more complex. A brief explanation is provided along with example figures.

- Drill Stop – A hole drilled into material at tip of crack (Figure 6.13).
- Grinding – Grind surface cracks to smooth surface to prevent further growth (Figure 6.14).
- Grouting – Grout interior of member to increase strength (Figure 6.15).
- Wet Welding – Weld on doublers, shear pups, and other secondary structure to reinforce member in region of damage. Key concerns with wet welding are that the weld is not as strong as an above water dry weld (Figures 6.16 and 6.19).
- Stressed Clamping – A bolted clamp using contact stress of member to clamp and repair damage.
- Dry Habitat Welding – Enclose the damage in an underwater habitat and dewater to perform dry weld (Figure 6.18).
- Stress Grouted Clamping – stressed clamp with grout inserted in the annulus between the member and clamp to account for deformations and fit-up tolerance. Clamp is ”stressed” by tightening bolts after the annulus is grouted. (Figures 6.20 and 6.21)

Figure 6.13 Drill Stops to Prevent Crack Propagation



Figure 6.14 Grinding to Prevent Crack Propagation at Connection

Figure 6.15 Grout Valve Installed on VD

Figure 6.16 Wet Welded Shear Pup

Figure 6.17 Habitat installed to perform dry welds



Figure 6.18 Welding inside Habitat



Figure 6.19 Wet Welded Doubler



Figure 6.20 Stress Grouted X-brace Clamp

Figure 6.21 Stress Grouted Leg Clamp

Observations pertaining to mitigations:

- Once repair methods have been decided upon, prior to detailed design of repairs it is recommended further underwater inspections be performed. Numerous projects have run across more damage than initially considered as a result of missed damage or the need to use nearby structure for final mitigation.
- Another area of consideration that has been an issue is time period between inspection and the repair. This is especially crucial if the damage occurs in the hurricane season and is not repaired until the following spring or summer, with the platform still in the damaged condition during the winter season. It has been an area of discussion on projects that the repair takes place during better weather and when they get back they discover more damage (i.e. new or existing).

7.0 PIPELINE PERFORMANCE

Information about damage to pipelines and risers is summarized and analyzed here to better understand the causes of damage and identify opportunities to improve performance in future events.

7.1 Summary Information

Data about damage to pipelines and risers was obtained from the MMS Database, which was sanitized to remove specific information about facility designations and owners/operators. These data were compiled from damage reports submitted by operators of platforms and pipelines, and the level of detail and completeness varies significantly from entry to entry. Therefore, classifications of the type and particularly the cause of damage are subjective and approximate. Operators were also contacted to obtain further detail about causes, but we were generally unsuccessful in obtaining more information.

The total number of damage reports for pipelines and risers is shown in Figure 7.1, including hurricanes from Andrew through Ike. Information for the hurricanes before 2008 was obtained from Southwest Research (1995), Stress Engineering (2005), DnV (2006) and DnV (2007). The number of damage reports for Ike is nearly the same as that for Katrina. As with the platforms, it is difficult to distinguish easily between damage caused by Gustav and damage caused by Ike since they occurred just weeks apart and impacted a similar area. For the damage reports that were attributed to a combination of Gustav and Ike (there are 17 reports, 6 for pipelines and 11 for risers), they are included in the summary statistics for both Gustav and Ike.

A breakdown of the reported damages for pipelines versus risers is shown in Figure 7.2. The vast majority of the damage reports are classified as risers versus pipelines (86 percent for risers versus 14 percent pipelines). Interestingly, there is more damage attributed to risers in Ike than for hurricanes Ivan, Katrina or Rita (Figure 7.2).

The locations of damaged pipelines and risers are shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4, respectively. For pipelines, the location is shown to the level of precision available; in some cases, a long segment is the best information we have about the location. For risers, multiple risers are commonly damaged at a single location, such as when the damage is caused by toppling of the platform, so the number of locations in Figure 7.4 is substantially smaller than the number of damage reports.



Figure 7.1 Total Number of Damage Reports



Figure 7.2 Damage Reports for Pipelines versus Risers



Figure 7.3 Pipeline Damage Locations for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike



Figure 7.4 Riser Damage Locations for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike

Statistics for the size of damaged pipelines and risers in Hurricanes Gustav and Ike are shown in Figures 7.5 and 7.6. The percentage of damaged pipelines greater than 18 inches in diameter, 25 percent (Figure 7.5), is about two times greater than for Ivan, Katrina and Rita. Most of the larger diameter pipelines that were damaged in Ike and Gustav carried gas or gas condensate. Statistics for the age of damaged pipelines and risers are shown in Figures 7.7 and 7.8. Statistics for the product carried by the damaged pipelines and risers are summarized in Table 7.1 and shown in Figures 7.9 and 7.10.



Figure 7.5 Diameter of Damaged Pipelines



Figure 7.6 Diameter of Damaged Risers



Figure 7.7 Age of Damaged Pipelines



Figure 7.8 Age of Damaged Risers

Table 7.1 Damage Reports by Product Code

Product Code	Product Code Definition	Number of Damaged Pipelines	Number of Damaged Risers
AIR	Pneumatic (gas)	1	0
BLGH	Bulk gas with trace levels of hydrogen sulfide (gas)	0	0
BLKG	Bulk gas – full well stream production from gas well(s) prior to first processing (gas)	2	58
BLKO	Bulk oil – full well stream production from oil well(s) prior to first processing (liquid)	5	40
CHEM	Corrosion inhibitor or other chemicals (liquid)	0	0
COND	Condensate or distillate transported downstream of first processing (liquid)	0	0
FLG	Flare gas (gas)	0	3
G/C	Gas and condensate service after first processing (liquid)	10	16
G/O	Gas and oil service after first processing (gas or liquid)	0	9
GAS	Gas transported after first processing (gas)	7	32
GASH	Processed gas with trace levels of hydrogen sulfide (gas)	0	0
INJ	Gas injection (gas)	0	0
LIFT	Gas lift (gas)	7	33
NGER	Natural gas enhanced recovery (gas)	0	0
O/W	Oil and water transported after first processing (liquid)	1	0
OIL	Oil transported after first processing (liquid)	10	54
SPLY	Supply Gas (gas)	4	3
TEST	Test (gas or liquid)	0	2
UMB	Umbilical line usually includes pneumatic or hydraulic control lines (gas or liquid)	0	33





Figure 7.9 Product Carried by Damaged Pipelines





Figure 7.10 Product Carried by Damaged Risers

7.2 Causes of Damage

An attempt was made to classify the cause of damage for pipelines and risers. The causes are difficult to categorize due to the uneven quality of damage reports and how the information from these reports is summarized in the MMS Database. In the database itself, the cause for every entry is listed as Natural Hazard for the primary cause and Storm/Hurricane for the secondary cause. However, the type of damage and the description of the damage provide insight into the potential causes. We also consulted previous studies on pipeline and riser damage (e.g., Stress Engineering 2005 and DnV 2006 and 2007) for guidance.

For pipelines, we classified the cause of damage into the categories described in Table 7.2. The two categories with the most incidents are Movement and Unknown (Figure 7.11). We suspect that many of the records classified as Unknown were caused by movement of the pipeline, but there is not enough information provided to make that classification. The damage records categorized as Platform Connection may belong in the Riser Database rather than the Pipeline Database. One of the two damage records categorized as Mudslide is unlikely to have been associated with a mudslide because it is not located in an area where the soils are weak enough for mudslide activity (see Section 7.3); however, it is kept in that category here because the description in the database refers specifically to a mudslide.

Table 7.2 Categories for Causes of Pipeline Damage for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike

Cause	Description	Number of Reports
Movement	Movement of the pipeline on the sea floor causing a rupture, kink or misalignment	14
Impact	Impact from a toppled platform, a toppled jack-up rig, a dragged anchor or debris causing a rupture, kink or dent	7
Pipeline Crossing Interaction	Crossing pipelines rub or bang causing a rupture, kink or dent	3
Platform Connection	Pipeline parted at or above water line at connection with platform (possibly should be classified as riser damage)	2
Mudslide	Seafloor instability causing a span, rupture, kink or misalignment	2
Unknown	Not possible to discern the cause from the information available	13



Figure 7.11 Causes of Pipeline Damage for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike

The causes of pipeline damage by location are shown in Figure 7.12. Two features are notable in this map. First, the pipeline damage caused by impact tends to be in a narrower band than the overall damage (Figure 7.12) and seems to be closely associated with the right-hand side of the hurricanes. Second, the pipeline damage caused by movement (including unknown since these likely are due to movement) occurs over a relatively broad band that incorporates the entire region where pipeline damage occurred.



Figure 7.12 Locations of Pipeline Damage by Cause for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike

For risers, the causes of damage are classified into the categories described in Table 7.3. The majority of damage to risers was caused by toppled platforms (Figure 7.13). The distinction between damage caused by wave action or by pipeline movement on the seafloor is not always clear based on the available information. We generally classified damage as due to wave action when the damage was near the waterline or a specific reference to wave action was made in the record. Damage due to pipeline movement was generally associated with the riser parting, bending or pulling from the clamps near the sea floor (Figure 7.14). This damage could be due to the pipeline pulling on the riser, but it could also be due to the riser breaking free from the clamps and then pulling on the pipeline.

Table 7.3 Categories for Causes of Riser Damage for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike

Cause	Description	Number of Reports
Platform	Platform toppled or severely damaged	165
Waves	Wave action causing bend, dislocation or rupture	27
Impact	Impact by floating or falling objects causing bend, dislocation or rupture	6
Pipeline Movement	Pipeline movement causing dislocation (separation from clamps) or rupture	18
Unknown	Not possible to discern the cause from the information available	57



Figure 7.13 Causes of Riser Damage for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike

Figure 7.14 Example of Riser Pulled from Leg Clamp

7.3 Mudslides

Wave-induced mudslides caused damage to pipelines in hurricanes Camille (1969), Ivan (2004) and Katrina (2005) (Nodine et al. 2006, 2007 and 2008). A product of the most recent work was a methodology to assess the potential for mudslides based on the wave heights and wave periods from the hurricane hindcast. Since damage to pipelines due to mudslides was reported for Gustav and not Ike, these storms provide an opportunity to investigate how well the methodology works.

Wave-induced mudslides are caused by differential bottom pressures underneath waves (Figure 7.15). The pressure difference imparts shear stresses in the soil; if these shear stresses together with the in situ shear stresses due to the weight of the soil on a slope exceed the shear strength of the soil, then a rotational slip will occur (Figure 7.16). The depth of the slip will be approximately 50 to 100 feet deep and it will cover an area in plan that is several thousand feet across (Nodine et al. 2008). Therefore, a large mass of soil will move and can cause significant damage to a pipeline or even a platform if the mudslide intersects the platform. The types of damaged caused by a mudslide to a pipeline include the pipeline left spanning across hundreds of feet (if it is on the head scarp side of the rotation), the pipeline buried under tens of feet of soil (if it is on the toe side of the rotation), or the pipeline being displaced or ruptured due to high tensile and bending stresses.



Figure 7.15 Differential Bottom Pressure under Wave (from Nodine et al. 2009)



Figure 7.16 Failure Mechanism for Wave-Induced Mudslide

The soils are weak enough to be susceptible to wave-induced mudslides only within the Mississippi Delta where the sediment has been deposited recently and has not yet come to equilibrium with the overburden stress (or it is underconsolidated). This mudslide prone region is shown in Figure 7.17.



Figure 7.17 Mudslide-Prone Area (from Nodine et al. 2008)

The potential for mudslides is driven by the wave-induced bottom pressures. An estimate for the maximum bottom pressure is obtained as follows:

$$p_{max} = \frac{\gamma_w}{2}\left(\frac{H_{max}}{\cosh(\frac{2\pi}{L_{H_{max}}}d)}\right)I_{3D} \qquad (1)$$

where H_{max} is the peak wave height from the hindcast, $L_{H_{max}}$ is the wave length associated with H_{max}, d is the water depth, and I_{3D} is an adjustment factor to account for the three-dimensional shape of a wave (a value of 0.84 was recommended by Nodine et al. 2008). The wave length associated with the largest wave is approximated by the following equation

$$L_{H_{max}} = \frac{g(0.9T_p)^2}{2\pi} \tanh\left(\frac{2\pi d}{L_{H_{max}}}\right) \quad (2)$$

where g is the acceleration of gravity and T_p is the peak wave period from the hurricane hindcast.

Estimated values for the maximum or peak bottom pressure are shown in Figure 7.18 for Gustav and Ike in the mudslide-prone area. The bottom pressures tend to increase with decreasing water depth. The bottom pressures in this region were greater for Gustav than Ike.

The potential for mudslides is quantified in Figure 7.19 as the chance that a mudslide would happen during the peak waves within any particular 4,000-foot by 4,000-foot area. This chance depends on the hurricane waves, the water depth, the average bottom slope and the shear strength of the soil. To account for variability in the strength of the soil, the frequency that different soil strengths occur throughout this mudslide-prone area is used; therefore, the chance for a mudslide in this map does not represent the site-specific potential at a location where the soil strength is known. Details for this calculation are provided in Nodine et al. (2007).

A comparison of Gustav and Ike shows that the potential for mudslides was greater in Gustav than for Ike (Figure 7.19). This result is consistent with the reports of mudslides damaging pipelines in Gustav but not Ike. For context, a comparison of Ivan (mudslides reported), Katrina (mudslides reported), Gustav (mudslide reported) and Ike (no mudslides reported) is shown in Figure 7.20.

The report of a mudslide does not necessarily mean that a mudslide actually occurred. For example, one of the reports for a mudslide damaging a pipeline in Gustav corresponds to a pipeline in Ship Shoal that is well to the west of the mudslide-prone area. It is possible that this damage was caused by bottom currents moving the pipeline or the shallow soil around the pipeline, but not a rotational mudslide. In addition, a lack of a report of a mudslide does not necessarily mean that a mudslide did not occur. To discern a mudslide, it generally takes a detailed investigation with side scan sonar over a relatively large region (about a mile across) around the vicinity of the pipeline. One of the reports for pipeline damage in Gustav is for a location in the mudslide-prone area and describes a pipeline that is spanning for 200 feet in either direction of a subsea tie-in. This damage may well be due to a mudslide. There are at least four other damage reports within the mudslide-prone area that may be associated with a mudslide if investigated further (Figure 7.19 shows the locations). Finally, mudslides may have occurred within the mudslide-prone area during either Gustav or Ike, but they are not known about because they did impact a facility.



(a) Hurricane Gustav



(b) Hurricane Ike

Figure 7.18 Relative Magnitudes for Maximum Bottom Pressure in Mississippi Delta for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike



(a) Hurricane Gustav



(b) Hurricane Ike

Figure 7.19 Mudslide Potential Maps for Hurricanes Gustav and Ike



Figure 7.20 Comparison of Mudslide Potential for Hurricanes Ivan, Katrina, Gustav and Ike

7.4 Currents

Currents below the sea surface and at the seafloor play an important role in loading pipelines and risers during hurricanes. Historically, the focus in the offshore oil industry has been on modeling, measuring and predicting winds and waves from hurricanes. Recently, due to the severe storm surge in Katrina, there has been an intense effort to better understand the forces moving the water toward the coastline, including currents. A numerical model, ADCIRC (2006), has been adapted and combined with models for waves in order to better predict storm surges and currents. This model has been calibrated using Katrina and Rita (e.g., IPET 2008) and is now being applied to Gustav and Ike.

In order to better understand the potential forces on pipelines and risers, currents have been predicted with these state-of-the art numerical models based on all available hindcast data for Ike. This work is ongoing and the results presented here are preliminary. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration are sponsoring the work. Acknowledgment is due to Prof. Rick

Leuttich from the University of North Carolina, Prof. Joannes Westerink from Notre Dame, and Prof. Clint Dawson from the University of Texas at Austin for sharing these results.

The results to date are for the depth-averaged current speed. The depth-averaged current is representative of the current profile across the entire depth of water, and will be smaller than the current speed at the surface. The maximum depth-averaged current speeds at different locations are shown in Figure 7.21 for Ike. The magnitudes for these depth-averaged currents are unexpectedly large. The location in Figure 7.21 where the maximum depth-averaged current speed is 2.3 m/s (South Timbalier 211) is in about 150 feet of water. For comparison, the depth-averaged current speed corresponding to the 100-year design conditions in this water depth is less than 1.5 m/s. Therefore, these depth-averaged current speeds are unexpectedly large and may explain why there was so much damage to pipelines and risers in Ike (Figure 7.1).

The directions for the maximum currents tend to be perpendicular to the damaged pipelines (Figure 7.21), which is consistent with the damage being caused by the current either lifting and moving the pipeline or scouring the soil around the pipeline. The product in the pipeline is shown in Figure 7.22, which also suggests that high bottom currents may have moved around the lighter (gas) pipelines in this hurricane.



Figure 7.21 Maximum Depth-Averaged Current Magnitude and Direction for Hurricane Ike with Damaged Pipeline Locations



Figure 7.22 Maximum Depth-Averaged Current Magnitude and Direction for Hurricane and Damaged Pipeline Types

7.5 Summary and Recommendations

There was considerable damage to pipelines and risers in hurricanes Gustav and Ike. More risers were damaged in Ike than Katrina. The most prevalent cause of damage to pipelines is movement that can rupture pipelines, pull pipelines from risers and pull risers from clamps. The most prevalent cause of damage to risers is toppling of the platform. There is evidence that wave-induced mudslides occurred in Gustav but not Ike, which is consistent with the predicted potential for mudslides based on the hindcast data. Current speeds below the water surface and at the bottom in Ike were possibly substantially larger than expected based on design assumptions.

The following recommendations are provided in order to improve understanding of the causes for riser and pipeline damage:

1. Require more consistent and more detailed information be provided in damage reports concerning the location of the damage, the type of damage and any evidence about the cause of damage.
2. Apply the new modeling and calibration work for storm surges and currents to predict the loads on pipelines and risers, to assess the potential for damage, and to compare the predictions with observations.
3. Perform analyses considering pipelines and risers that were not damaged together with those that were damaged to better understand the causes of damage and what measures might best mitigate those causes.

8.0 SUMMARY OF RESULTS

This project has evaluated large amounts of data and information related to the performance of fixed and floating platforms and pipelines in hurricanes Gustav and Ike. The overall findings, as in past studies, indicate that there was no life-loss or major environmental problems as a direct result of the hurricanes. This is attributable to the prior evacuation of the platforms and to the use of sub-surface safely valves and shut-in of wells prior to the hurricane arrival.

Some of these evaluations and findings were similar to those from other studies of fixed platform performance in hurricanes. For example, the finding that most of the destroyed platforms were classified as A-2. Also most destroyed platforms were older vintage structures of the 1950s through 1970s where there was little or no industry guidance on how to properly design an offshore structure. Other findings are new to these storms. For example the number of tripods destroyed. Another finding is there was one L-1 High Consequence platform that was destroyed. This is the first such instance where a L-1 has been destroyed.

The following summarizes specific key results and associated recommendations identified by this study. The description is intentionally brief since this is a summary of prior discussion elsewhere in this report. See the indicated section for full details. The findings are listed in general order of importance.

Platforms:

1. Performance of Tripod Platforms.
Result – There were five recent vintage tripods destroyed during Gustav and Ike, a surprisingly high number. One was an L-1 structure and 4 were L-2 structures. While tripods lack redundancy, offering little in way of alternative load paths in the event they are damaged, they also are also more dynamically sensitive especially in deeper waters (i.e., greater than 200 feet). See Section 4.4.
Recommendation – Further investigation into the tripod failures, and damage where data is available. Limits on the use of tripods in deeper water should be considered as well as a "robustness" check to ensure that the tripod can still function adequately should it sustain damage to the jacket or foundation.

2. Platform Robustness.
Result – Numerous platforms experienced storm conditions greater than 50 year L-2 and 100 year L-1 design practice. While most performed as expected or better since they experienced an event larger than their design, it is clear that offshore structures require "robustness" that not only allows them to survive, but perhaps sustain damage if the elastic design event is exceeded. While the 50 or 100 year design approach provides inherent factors of safety, additional checks are required to ensure that the platform will survive extreme conditions. For example, checks for efficient load paths and redundancy. See Section 5.2.1.

Recommendation – A second check be performed during the initial design of offshore platforms to ensure they will survive extreme hurricanes such as Ike, that may exceed the platform elastic design criteria. This is especially important for High Consequence platforms. See Item 5 below.

3. Performance of Floating Structures.
Result – Deepwater floating structures performed well in both hurricanes with only one structure suffering major damage due to a toppled drill rig. There was minor damage to other structures, mostly from high winds and wave run-up on the structure.
Recommendation – Operators should follow API guidance on tie-down of rigs, such as RP 2TD, especially on floating structures which have large motions in hurricanes.

4. Performance of A-2 manned-evacuated platforms.
Result – The majority of the A-2 manned-evacuated platforms that were destroyed experienced metocean conditions equal to, but predominately larger than, the Section 17 A-2 Ultimate Strength Criteria. On average these platforms experienced conditions 5 to 10 feet greater than this criteria. This finding confirms that these structures which could be manned during a Sudden Hurricane and should be able to withstand the API defined Sudden Hurricane conditions. See Section 5.2.1.
Recommendation – API is still investigating the Sudden Hurricane conditions and if they have changed then the findings of this report need to be reconfirmed. Initial indications are that the Sudden Hurricane conditions are the same as before Ike and Gustav and even Katrina and Rita.

5. Performance of L-1 platforms
Result - There was one L-1 platform that was destroyed during Ike which was a deepwater tripod. As no damage data was available for this study, the number of damaged L-1 platforms, if any, is unknown. L-1 represents the High Consequence API exposure category for fixed platforms and also the latest API approach for metocean loading including design to 100 year conditions. Much like Katrina and Rita, Gustav and Ike essentially "proof loaded" these platforms to loads at or above the L-1 criteria and the majority of platforms survived. This validates the L-1 design approach. See Section 5.2.1 and Item 1 above.
Recommendation – As a result of over 50% of these platforms seeing conditions greater than the 100 year design and it is recommended robustness checks in Item 2 above be performed on new High Consequence structures in order to ensure they will survive extreme hurricanes.

6. Pancake Leg Damage.
Result: To date there have been 21 documented cases of this type of damage. In most cases the D/t ratio was over 60 and the average thickness transition between joint can and nominal leg was 5/8 inches. It is likely that several of the destroyed platforms had this issue which ultimately resulted in their destruction. See Section 5.2.3.
Recommendation: Additional study is recommended to better understand this type of damage and modify the new platform design process accordingly (e.g., establish D/t limits for legs). In addition, guidelines should be developed to determine if an existing platform is susceptible to this problem (e.g., thin walled legs) and recommendations developed to prevent the problem from occurring, such as grouting the legs.

7. Crest Comparison to Required Deck Height.
Result: Over 40% of the platforms exposed were expected to see wave in deck if their deck height was set at the recommended API deck height. The majority of these are classified as A-2 platforms and their deck heights are checked per Section 17 based on Sudden Hurricane conditions which are much less than 100 year conditions. In contrast, High Consequence L-1 and A-1 platforms and Medium Consequence L-2 platforms which have their deck elevations established according to 100 year conditions, had a low percentage of platforms that would have expected to see WID. See Section 5.2.2.
Recommendation: The API A-2 deck elevation curves are an indicator if a platform will survive a sudden hurricane, but they are not a good indicator if the platform will be damaged or destroyed in larger hurricanes. Platform owners should be educated on the destruction or damage and associated potential downtime that can occur for platforms that have low decks, especially A-2 platforms, or when critical production or other equipment and systems are located on lower decks that can be impacted by waves. Consideration should be given to relocate such equipment to higher decks.

8. Foundations.
Result: Numerous leaning platforms were observed including several with suspected pile foundation failures. These were some of the first documented pile foundation failures in hurricanes. In terms of vintage, the majority of the observations were of recent design and installed in the last 10 years, with more tripods contributing to the structure type. See Item 1 above and Section 6.1.2.
Recommendation: The guidance in MMS TAR Study 612 which provides an in-depth study of the performance of foundations in hurricanes, including Ike, should be followed for platform design and assessment. In particular, the document provides an improved approach for assessment of the foundations of existing platforms as well as guidance to include pile flexibility in determining pile penetration for new platform design.

9. Crown Shims.
Result: Several jacket pile shim connections failed and proved to be the "weak link" in the platform design. The majority of these failures are attributed to an overloaded connection that was poorly designed. It is likely that this is the initiating flaw in several of the destroyed platforms. See Section 6.1.2.
Recommendation: It is recommended further study be performed to provide improved guidance on design of this connection for both strength and fatigue (low cycle, high stress) for new platforms. The guidance should also include an approach to determine if an existing platform has this type of flaw so that corrective action can be taken.

Pipelines:

1. Performance of Pipelines and Risers.

Result: Numerous pipelines and risers experienced movements similar to prior hurricanes. More risers were damaged in Ike than Katrina. Bottom currents were larger than predicted in some cases and perhaps the reason for numerous pipeline movements. See Section 7.4

Recommendation: Apply the new modeling and calibration work for storm surges and currents to predict the loads on pipelines and risers, to assess the potential for damage, and to compare the predictions with observations.

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Appendix A

Platforms Destroyed by Gustav



Figure D.1 – ST 21 ”GA” – Pre-Gustav

Appendix B
Platforms Destroyed by Ike



Figure E.1 - EC 272 “D”, “D-Aux”, and “E” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.2 - EC 272 H – Pre-Ike

Figure E.3 - EI 339 “B” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.4 - EI 339 “C” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.5 - EI 330 “C” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.6 - EI 258 “G” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.7 - EC 330 "A" – Pre-Ike



Figure E.8 - EI 397 "A" – Pre-Ike



Figure E.9 - EI 371 “B” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.10 - EI 390 “A” – Pre-Ike

Ewing Bank 947 “A”

Installed 1990 4-Pile Platform Water Depth 477 ft

Figure E.11 - EW 947 “A” – Pre-Ike

South Marsh 49 “F”

Installed 1993 4-Pile Platform Water Depth 98 ft

Figure E.12 - SM 49 “F” – Pre-Ike

Figure E.13 - VR 122 “B” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.14 - VR 267 “C” – Pre-Ike

Figure E.15 - VR 329 "A" – Pre-Ike

Figure E.16 - EC 328 "A" – Pre-Ike

Figure E.17 - EI 179 “C” – Pre-Ike

Figure E.18 - SS 154 “I” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.19 - ST 196 "A" – Pre-Ike



Figure E.20 - VR 386 "B" – Pre-Ike



Figure E.21 - VR 284 "A" – Pre-Ike

Figure E.22 - VR 281 "A" – Pre-Ike



Figure E.23 - EI 292 “B” – Pre-Ike

Figure E.24 - EI 266 “E” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.25 - WC 473 “A” – Pre-Ike

Figure E.26 - EC 281 “A” and “A-AUX” – Pre-Ike

Figure E.27 - ST 195 “A” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.28 - SM 48 “B-PRD” – Pre-Ike

East Cameron 229 "A"

Installed 1971 4-Pile Platform Water Depth 115 ft

Figure E.29 - EC 229 "A" – Pre-Ike

Eugene Island 296 "B Prod"

Installed 1972 8-Pile Platform Water Depth 214 ft

Figure E.30 - EI 296 "B-PRD" – Pre-Ike

Figure E.31 - EI 330 “A” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.32 - EI 349 “A” – Pre-Ike



Figure E.33 - EI 331 “A” – Pre-Ike

Photos unavailable for the following platforms

1. EC-265-GP-Valve
2. EC-272-C
3. EC-272-C-Aux1
4. EC-281-A
5. EC-364-A
6. EI-119-7
7. EI-125-7
8. EI-175-E
9. EI-268-A
10. EI-288-A
11. EI-302-A
12. SS-208-F
13. SS-253-A
14. SS-274-T-27-Valve
15. SS-291-B
16. ST-148-Cais B
17. ST-175-T-22-Valve
18. VR-131-14
19. VR-201-B
20. VR-217-C
21. VR-217-F
22. VR-320-C
23. WC-248-2
24. EI-267-I